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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
 
 
CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS OF ISLAM IN ASTRAKHAN, RUSSIA: MOSQUE 
CONSTRUCTION AND COMMUNITY BUILDING 
 
This thesis examines how and under what influences communities of Islamic faith 
have developed in post-Soviet Russia. My arguments are based on research conducted in 
Astrakhan, Russia in the summer of 2009.  Astrakhan is the capital of Astrakhan Oblast 
in southwest Russia and has a reputation for being a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic 
city.  Astrakhan is home to Russians, Tatars, Kazakhs, Kalmyks, and many other 
nationalities.  I draw from interviews and newspaper analysis to examine what the local 
landscape of Islam looks like in Astrakhan, how has it changed since the collapse of the 
USSR, and what future trends are emerging. Mosque renovations and demolitions are the 
center of my analysis.  
     Drawing on scholarship in critical geopolitics and critical geographies of religion, this 
paper seeks to understand how the Kremlin and other levels of government influence the 
development of Islam locally within Astrakhan.  Interviews are used to study local 
understandings of the changing forms of Islam in Astrakhan, and to see if locals believe 
that the state has been supportive to the Islamic community.  My research contributes to 
wider scholarship on the importance of the relationship between the state and local 
Islamic communities for Islamic nation-building in the Russian Federation.  
Keywords: critical geographies of religion, critical geopolitics, Russia, Islam, former 
Soviet Union 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This thesis examines how and under what influences communities of Islamic faith 
develop locally in Astrakhan, Russia.  Astrakhan, the capital of Astrakhan Oblast, is 
located in southwest Russia and has a reputation for being a multi-confessional and 
multi-ethnic city. It is the thirty-third largest city in Russia, with a population of 504, 501. 
(Russian Federation Census, 2002). More than 130 ethnic groups are located within the 
city, but there is a large Russian majority population of 73%. As Russia’s southern 
outpost, Astrakhan’s proximity to the Silk Road and location on the Volga ensured 
international trade and the intermingling of different cultures throughout its history 
(Riasanovsky, 2005). Within the city, there is a sizable Islamic presence. The Islamic 
community within Astrakhan is very diverse, consisting of members of Avar, Azeri, 
Tatar, Kazakh, and Russian ethnic groups.  Today, the region’s largest Islamic population 
are the Kazakhs, at 14.3 percent of the region’s total, and the second-largest is Tatars 
comprising 7.1 (Russian Federation Census, 2002). Kazakhstan and Iran have consulates 
in Astrakhan city.  This diversity makes Astrakhan an appropriate site to study the 
dynamics of Islamic-community building within Russia.   
 This research investigates how the Kremlin and other levels of the state government 
influence the development of Islam within Astrakhan.  My research questions are: 
 What does the local landscape of Islam look like in Astrakhan? What did it look 
like in the past, and what are plans for the future?  
  
 How does the Kremlin influence the development of Islam locally within 
Astrakhan?  More specifically, is the state sponsoring or preventing mosque 
construction and Islamic scholarship? What other organizations or sources are 
providing financial and other means of support (i.e., wealthy donors, other Islamic 
communities)?   
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I answer these questions through an analysis of processes of mosque construction as a 
function of community building. My research considers the religious landscape as 
playing a key role a key role in political formation and identity maintenance.  In 
Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson writes that a nation is:   
“an imagined political community, imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow members, or meet them, or even hear of them, yet 
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion…Communities are to be 
distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are 
imagined (Anderson, 1993: 6).” 
 
A shared destiny has to be imagined between the members of a community in order to 
link them together. One way that elites work to create this unity is through invented 
traditions. Invented traditions work to create a normalized, universal view of the past and 
to establish rituals and shared values in the present, which must be preserved in the future 
to keep the imagined community alive (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1992).  Religious 
landscapes can serve as a form of an invented tradition, which are used by nation-states to 
manufacture and create a national past and shared roots.  In this thesis, I treat the 
landscape as a “social hieroglyph” (Mitchell, 2002: 15), symbolic of social and political 
relationships, and investigate what it reveals about state-mosque relations. My arguments 
are based on qualitative research conducted in Astrakhan in the summer of 2009.   
Section 1.1:  Russia as a Multi-ethnic and Multi-religious state 
Just as Voltaire famously stated that the Holy Roman Empire was not Holy, Roman, 
or an Empire, one can think of the Russian Federation as being neither Russian nor a 
Federation (Goble 2004). While this is, of course, a gross exaggeration, stating that the 
Russian Federation is not Russian draws light to the diversity within the Federation’s 
borders. In contemporary Russia, there are over 160 ethnic groups.  79% of the 
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population is of Russian nationality, with Tatars, Ukrainians, Chechens, Armenians, and 
many other groups making up the rest of the total. According to the 2002 Russian census, 
only 1.6% of the population consists of people from ethnicities not indigenous to the 
Russian territory. 22 out of the 83 federal territories within Russia are homelands of 
ethnic minority groups. While Russian territories exhibit a decline in population, growth 
is occurring in the Caucuses and Siberia. The birthrates of ethnic Russians are lower than 
those of other groups, such as Chechens. Although Russians make up the majority of the 
country, population projections suggest that by 2030, the country could have a non-
Russian majority (Goble, 2004: 78).  
Besides being multi-ethnic, Russia is also a multi-confessional country. There are no 
census data collected on religious affiliations, so it is hard to estimate the number of 
peoples belonging to each religion (Heleniak, 2006). However, religious communities 
have to register with the Russian government, so there are data available on the number 
of official congregations of different religious groups. Russian Orthodoxy is the largest 
religious group in Russia, with 29,784 organizations, while Protestants have 4453 and 
Catholics have 255 communities. Islam has over 5,000 organizations, Judaism has 267, 
and Buddhism has 192. There are also many smaller religious groups in Russia, such as 
Shaman and pagan (Religare, 2006). These data do not account for non-registered 
religious communities, or the numbers of members of each community. However, it does 
serve to highlight that Orthodoxy has the largest number of communities, while Islam has 
the second largest. 
Claiming the Russian Federation is not a federation criticizes both the vertically-
organized governmental structure of the country as well as the Kremlin’s inability to 
create political stability within its borders.  The Russian Federation appears to a liberal 
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democracy; there is a president, prime minister, and bicameral legislature. The federation 
is divided into 83 territorial units which receive two representatives each in the upper 
house of the legislature. Some of these units are republics, which are home to ethnic 
minorities, while others are oblasts, which are provinces with usually a majority ethnic 
Russian population (Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 65).  
Yet, under Putin, governmental power has been concentrated increasingly in vertical 
structures.  Regional government has become more centralized. In his first term, the 
federal territories were divided into seven districts, led by an administrator appointed by 
the president whose purpose was to ensure that regional governments follow federal law 
(Sukhov, 2008). Also, the laws regarding representatives in the upper house of the federal 
legislature were changed. The governor and an elected representative used to serve as 
territorial representatives, but now representatives are appointed by local officials and 
must be confirmed by the president (Sukhov, 2008).  
Although regional governments have become more centralized, regionalism 
challenges the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. The First Chechen War was fought 
from 1994-96, under Yeltsin, and the Second Chechen War from 1999-2009. Chechen 
insurgents want to separate from the federation and establish their own country (Hahn, 
2007). Islamic extremism has become synonymous with the Chechen insurgents and 
threatens Russian political stability (Hahn, 2007). 
As this discussion shows, the Russian Federation has a multinational, multi-
confessional populace.  But, state-mosque relationships are complicated at the national 
level. On one hand, Russia has been in a civil war with Chechens, identified as separatist 
Islamic fundamentalists. In 1999, Russia also outlawed Wahabbism and extreme forms of 
Islam (Hahn, 2007).  Despite the war, Putin has tried to show that the Russian state is 
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supportive of non-extremist forms of Islam. In 2005, while attending the Chechen 
parliament in Grozny, Putin stated, “Those who are fighting on the other side (Chechen 
militants) don't know that Russia has always been the most loyal, reliable and consistent 
defender of the Islamic interests. By destroying Russia they are destroying one of the 
major supports for the Islamic world (Shmeliov, 2005: 2).” The Russian state imagines 
itself as supportive of more moderate forms of Islam, while other forms of Islam are 
perceived as a threat to the state.  
 
Section 1.2:  The Russian State and Vertical Power 
The relationships between the Russian state and non-separatist Islamic communities 
of faith are part of my analysis.  Within this project, the term “state” interchangeably 
refers to government power at the local, regional, or national level.  “Kremlin” is used as 
a metaphor for the national level of government power.  I analyze state-Islamic relations 
as localized in Astrakhan. The nation-state has been considered the dominant political 
unit of territorial division since the Treaty of Westphalia (Agnew 2000). Yet, the nature 
of the relationship of nationality to statehood varies from country to country.  In regards 
to Russia, Paul Goble (2004) writes: 
The Russian state became an empire long before the Russian people became a 
nation, and as a result, the Russian state has never been a nation state, a compact 
between the government and the people, but the Russian people have always been 
a state nation, a nation not defined by itself but those with power (2004: 79). 
 
To imagine Russia as a state-nation rather than a nation-state highlights the power of its 
vertical, centralized government. Although power may be dispersed amongst different 
actors in networks, and a state may never have full hegemonic control over its 
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constituents, in Russia the state has always attempted to centralize power into vertical 
structures (Martinez-Vazquez and Boex, 2001; Sukhov 2008).  
This tendency is reflected in efforts to centralize Islam. The Russian state encourages 
the registration of Islamic communities into official Islamic structures, with the main one 
being the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (TsDUM). The Spiritual Directorate 
was created in the Soviet era to monitor mosque activities and make sure that they were 
in line with party ideology. In the Soviet era, these boards, located in Bashkortostan and 
Dagestan, organized theological matters and were heavily monitored by the government. 
They were overseen by the State Committee of Religious Affairs and were monitored by 
the KGB. Now, there are over 60 of these directorates. However, the boundaries for the 
directories often overlap, and many communities do not register at all (Walker, 2005: 
262). Communities also join two other national-level Islamic structures, the Council of 
Muftis of Russia and the Coordinating Council of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus 
(Matsuzato, 2007).  Walker sites the organizational fluidity of Islam as one of the reasons 
a national-level hierarchy akin to the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church has not 
developed, as well as Russian law which gives religious organizations autonomy (2005: 
263). Despite this autonomy, the leaders of TSDUM and representatives from the 
Kremlin have voiced interest for the government to create a centralized, well-ordered 
spiritual directorate to curb extremism (Goble, 2009).  Although the government in 
Moscow has no immediate plans to exert state controls and create a vertical power 
structure for Russian Islam, the three already-existing state approved structures have 
come to define “official” Islam in Russia (Matsuzato, 2007). 
The leadership of these official organizations meets with the Russian president 
annually at the Kremlin, and also in times of emergency, such as in the aftermath of the 
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hostage crisis at the Dubrovka Theatre Centre in Moscow in October 2002.  Transcripts 
of all official meetings between the President and Islamic leadership are published on the 
Kremlin website and often copied in national newspapers, such as Izvestaya Gazeta.  
In this thesis, I investigate to what extent the nation-state and official Islamic 
structures are distanced from Islamic communities of faith, looking at whether or not they 
exhibit authority at the local level.  I study how vertical power structures impact Islamic 
communities in their everyday life, and also how Islamic communities in turn support or 
subvert these vertical power structures.  This research provides an analysis of how 
geopolitical discourses produce everyday landscapes of religion, and how landscapes of 
religion affect geopolitics.  
 
Section 1.3:  Outline of Thesis:  
My research is informed by the fields of feminist geopolitics and critical geographies 
of religion. In Chapter Two, I examine literatures on geopolitics, critical geopolitics, and 
feminist geopolitics to understand the advantages and disadvantages of geopolitical 
approaches and to see how geographers have tried to move geopolitics from being a form 
of statecraft to a way of interrogating how everyday life and national and international 
political processes are constitutive of each other.  I also draw from literatures on the 
critical geographies of religion, especially the politics of claiming sacred space. I focus 
my study on Islam in Astrakhan on mosque construction as a function of community 
building. Constructing a mosque requires the community to interact with local, state, and 
even national and international entities.  
In Chapter Three, I introduce my research site and outline my methods.  First, I 
provide an in -depth look at the Islamic community in Astrakhan and provide a brief 
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overview of several of the mosques in Astrakhan. Because this is a localized study, I use 
a mix of archival research and qualitative methods. I consult a variety of archival 
materials, such as presidential speeches, governmental holiday addresses, and news 
articles. I also conducted semi-structured interviews in Astrakhan and use the transcripts 
and field notes taken as sources on contemporary mosque-state relations.  
The fourth chapter draws on these empirical data. Here, I examine the discourses 
surrounding state-Islamic relations at the national and local level. The first part of this 
chapter focuses on discourses on state-Islamic relations produced by the national 
government and leaders in official Islamic structures. In the second half, I examine to 
what extent geopolitical discourses produced on the national level about translate to what 
is going on the ground within Astrakhan.  
In chapter five I conclude by summarizing my research findings.  I argue that the state 
takes a contradictory stance on developing Islam within Astrakhan.  On the one hand, the 
state tries to create ties with “official” Islamic communities to show that it is tolerant of 
Islam, despite separatist movements in the Caucuses. Yet, on the other hand, as my 
research shows, the notion that the state is generally tolerant of moderate forms of Islam 
needs to be questioned. Overall, my project contributes to understanding how geopolitical 
motivations influence the Russian government's relationship with Islamic communities 
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Chapter 2: Review of Geopolitics and Geographies of Religion 
Geopolitical concerns shape religious landscapes and communities of faith.  In this 
study, a critical geopolitical approach will be outlined and then employed to understand 
the workings of state and non-state power in Islamic community building.  Before 
proceeding with this analysis, I will situate my research in the appropriate literatures on 
geopolitics and geographies of religion that have informed my study.  In the first part of 
this section, I will discuss literatures on geopolitics, critical geopolitics, and feminist 
geopolitics.  This discussion highlights the advantages and shortcomings of geopolitical 
approaches in studying how religious communal spaces are affected by the nation-state 
and other political actors. Then, I will turn to literatures on the geographies of religion to 
understand how scholars have studied sacred and secular places. After examining these 
bodies of literatures, I will be able to situate my research on Islam in Astrakhan at the 
intersection of work being done in both the critical geographies of religion and feminist 
geopolitics. In the conclusion, I outline the conceptual approach of this study, which 
combines aspects of critical feminist geopolitics and critical geographies of religion.  
Section 2.1:  Classical Geopolitics 
The development of geography as a discipline is linked with enlightenment 
exploration; similarly geopolitics has its origins with the rise of colonialism and empire-
building (Livingstone 1993, Gilmartin and Kofman, 2004: 113).  Two scholars associated 
with the birth of geopolitics in the second half of the nineteenth century are H.J. 
Mackinder, a British geographer, and Frederich Ratzel, a German geographer (Gilmartin 
and Kofman, 2004).  These are two major individuals in geography’s hagiography 
(Livingstone 1993).  Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, outlined in his 1904 article “The 
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Geographical Pivot of History,” is considered one of the first geopolitical theories.  
Mackinder was a member of the Royal Geographical Society, a learned society started in 
1830 which was responsible for the organization and dissemination of information 
gathered in exploration.  Claiming that the age of exploration was over, and that the post-
Columbian age had begun, Mackinder’s theory divided the world into three sections -the 
World Island, the offshore island, and the outlying islands.  He argued that control over 
the pivot-area in the “World-Island,” which is located in present-day Russia, would allow 
an empire control over 50% of the world’s resources. He outlined a global imaginary 
where people inhabit a worldwide, closed political system, and where weaker territorial 
units would be taken over by the colonizing powers (Mackinder, 1904: 421-422).  The 
Heartland Theory was a call for Great Britain to transform from a maritime power into a 
land-based one to better position itself in the balance of politico-territorial power.  
Although never adopted by the British, the Heartland Theory showed that geopolitical 
thought was the preserve of elite, educated European men. Geopolitics has its origins in 
the struggle for territory and Eurocentric thought. 
Ratzel believed that modern states desired to achieve Grossraum (large space), much 
like the United States. He proposed that the state was not just territory, but also culture.  
Size mattered: large states had a higher civilization, and more “primitive” civilizations 
had less territory (Livingstone, 1993: 200-201, Agnew, 2003: 98-99).  States were the 
unit of the geopolitical order, but this order could change as more advanced states 
absorbed lesser ones. His ideas were folded into Nazi geopolitik through his student 
Rudolf Kjellen, who was the first person to use the term geopolitics. However, Ratzel 
called for a blending of cultures in the quest for Grossraum, rather than the biological 
unity of the Aryan race (Agnew, 2003: 99, Livingstone, 1993: 202).   
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Germany and Britain were two great imperial powers, and two forefathers of 
geopolitics emerged from their geographical-imperialist traditions (Gilmartin and 
Kofman, 2004: 114). This period of geopolitics is what Agnew calls “Naturalized 
geopolitics.” In this period, the nation-state was seen as the organic unit of world 
organization, and as a uniting force against political movements and laissez faire 
capitalism (Agnew, 2003: 98).  Although Gilmartin and Kofman write that no great 
geopolitical thinker came from France, due to France’s concerns with nation-building and 
identity, Parker’s work (2000) on the French School show that many geographers in 
France were thinking geopolitically. Although these French geographers may not be part 
of geography’s hagiography, their work envisions an alternative geopolitics and many 
ideas that resonate with critical geopolitical scholars.  
French geopolitical thought was structured explicitly against Ratzelian ideas, and was 
heavily influenced by Paul Vidal de la Blache. Vidal believed it was short-sighted for 
geographers to accept the state as the solo entity of geopolitical order. He argued in an 
1898 review of Ratzel's Politische Geographie, published in Annales de géographie, that 
the: 
The phenomena of political geography are not fixed entities. Cities and states 
represent forms which have already evolved to arrive at the point where we now 
observe them and which may still continue to evolve. We must therefore see them 
as being changing phenomena (les faits en mouvement) (Parker, 2000: 958). 
  
In France, a geopolitics emerged that did not uncritically privilege the nation-state as 
the unit of analysis and argued that geopolitical orders were ever-evolving.  
Vidal also wrote in his review of Politische Geographie that the state is part of a 
progression of political-territorial entities and thus arises the necessity not to study the 
state as an isolated compartment, some sort of a slice of the earth’s surface. By its 
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origins, its direction, its stages of development and the provisional nature of its existence 
it is part of a wider group (of phenomena) the life of which interpenetrates its own 
(Parker, 2000: 959).  According to geographers of the Vidalian tradition (Albert 
Demangeon, Jacques Ancel and Yves-Marie Goblet), the state drew legitimacy from 
treaties and legality, rather than claims to be the natural territorial order (Parker, 2000: 
959).  States were seen by Vidalians as enclosures which crippled a nation and the genre 
de vie (cultural milieu), in contrast to the Ratzelian idea that states were representative of 
the health of a nation (Parker, 2000: 962).   
Goblet, a Vidal-inspired French geographer, considered political geography as a “task 
of peace (Goblet 1955, 225)” He envisioned geopolitical space to be occupied by 
international emporiums, rather than nation-states.  To Goblet, the trading city was an 
example of open geographical space that had been deadened by the nation-state.  He 
proposed that borders of nations limited the potential flows between different places. The 
Hanseatic League is an example of the open geopolitical space he imagines. His 
international emporiums are not tied to nation-states, and are instead flexible lines of 
trade and communication linking territorial space (Parker, 2000: 962).  Perhaps, Goblet’s 
work can be seen as a precursor to calls from geographers to pay attention to flows that 
exist between places. 
 French geographers provide an alternative to the traditional genealogy of geopolitics, 
and perhaps one of the most important ideas that they had was that the nation-state was 
not the end of the evolution of political-territorial units. During the Cold War, geopolitics 
became characterized by the bifurcation of the world into communist and capitalist. 
There were two superpowers, the US and USSR (Agnew, 2003: 109).  States sided with 
the superpowers, and international entities like NATO, World Bank, Warsaw Pact and 
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CMEA developed. Although the nation-state was the preclusion for membership in these 
entities, a new international scale of geopolitics was created in the Cold War which 
would both challenge and reify the integrity of the nation-state.   
Section 2.2:  Critical Geopolitics  
In the 1990s, as the Cold War ended and globalization intensified, the field of critical 
geopolitics emerged. Agnew and O’Tuathail (1992) were the first to propose geopolitics 
as discourse, rather than as an empirical approach to statecraft (Dodds, 2001).  Rather 
than positing geopolitics as a science, geopolitics was proposed as a form of the state’s 
power/knowledge. They write that geopolitics: 
should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which 
intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way to 
represent a ‘world’ characterized by  particular types of places, peoples, and 
dramas.  In our understanding, the study of geopolitics is the study of the 
spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states (1992: 
192). 
Rather than describing global space, geopolitics creates certain stereotypes of global 
space to justify foreign policy experience. It is the role of critical geopolitics to expose 
how global space is written and to challenge hegemonic geopolitical worldviews 
(O’Tuathail, 1996: 20). Influenced by Foucault and Derrida, O’Tuathail looks at the 
underlying motivations for why elites and states shape geopolitical discourses in certain 
ways (Gilmartin and Kofman, 2004: 119).  
In Critical Geopolitics, O’Tuathail describes geopolitics as working to de-
territorialize and de-politicize international relations (1996: 53). One way geopolitics 
accomplishes this is through presenting itself as a classical tradition of thought or 
statecraft when it has always had an unstable meaning and was contingent upon its 
historical and social milieu (1996: 64). The debate over geopolitics does not mean the 
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term is useless, but rather that geopolitics must be understood in textuality, or within the 
networks of discourses that they produce and are produced.  Historical, geographical, and 
political specificity help to understand the various purposes of geopolitics within certain 
discourses.   
Geopolitics also depoliticizes international relations through the naturalization of 
ethnocentric tendencies. Even though classical geopolitical reasoning may divide the 
world into categories such as core and periphery, or first, second, and third world, these 
categories are based on Western, imperial forms of knowledge. From positions of power, 
elites and scholars sought to create an objective, panoptical view of the world in 
accordance with Cartesian perspectivalism. This refers to the ability to distance oneself 
from a view and become an objective subject seeing a picture in its whole. To see 
geopolitical space as whole is to see it as “closed space.” Territory is made visible by its 
organization into rational entities vis-a-vis nation-states. Critical geopolitics works to 
deconstruct  the god’s eye view of the world.  Rather than claim Cartesian 
perspectivalism as objective, a deconstructive critical geopolitics claims that this is a way 
of subjectively imagining global space through exercising power and naturalizing 
Eurocentrism. One aim of critical geopolitics is to raise awareness that divisions such as 
first/second/third or core/periphery are productions of space- spectacles rather than 
reality, and to question the purposes of elites presenting the world in certain ways 
(O’Tuathail, 1996: 34).  
Critical geopolitics sought to deconstruct geopolitics in order to expose the role it 
played in using violence to promote the sovereignty of the nation-state. By presenting the 
nation-state as the de-facto, natural unit of political analysis, geopolitics served 
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militaristic causes, resulting in colonialism, imperialism, and warfare. Militarism is 
understood as: 
state-society crystallization that brings together autocratic bureaucracy, 
technocratic professionalism, class segments, lethal technologies, economic 
interests, and popular nationalism, a crystallization that interweaves elements of 
many different sources of social power and is reducible to no single factor 
(O’Tuathail, 1996: 256). 
Geography and the struggle for territory took the blame for these violences, rather 
than the militaristic milieu which produced space to serve imperialistic aims (O’Tuathail, 
1996: 55).Significantly, critical geopolitics exposes space as a discursive subject, rather 
than as a container or object (Murphy et al. 2004: 621). 
Although Flint is wary of critical geopolitics for focusing on the history of 
geopolitical discourse, others in the discipline have outlined alternative forms of 
geopolitics (Flint, 2002 391). O’Tuathail adopted an approach of localized geopolitics in 
his application of critical geopolitics. This approach takes an empirical, disaggregated 
look at the local scale in international political matters. In an uncritical geopolitics, the 
local was understood as a slice of the global whole. Local places were imagined as 
synecdoche of their nation-states, rather than as diverse, potential international actors 
unto themselves. (O’Tuathail, forthcoming 4). O’Tuathail and Agnew write: 
The irony of practical geopolitical representations of place is that, in order to 
succeed, they necessitate the abrogation of genuine geographical knowledge about 
the diversity and complexities of places as social entities. A complex, diverse, and 
heterogeneous social mosaic of places is hypostatized into a singular, 
overdetermined and predictable actor (1992). 
Classical geopolitics can be considered a-geographical in the sense that it paints the 
world in broad, nation-size brushstrokes, ignoring place-based particularism (O’Tuathail, 
forthcoming 4).  Localized geopolitics calls for geographers to move from the 
global/macro-scale to a local one, and from capital cities to other areas. It disaggregates 
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abstractions such as first/second/third world through a call for localized studies. A 
localized study looks at how organizations work on the ground in specific places, and 
through networks of power rather than via centers of power. For example, O’Tuathail 
analyzes linkages amongst various ethnonationalist political parties, local warlords, and 
government agencies while investigating ethnic cleansing and population returns in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (O’Tuathail, forthcoming: 12).  Investigating population returns 
after ethnic cleansing with a localized geopolitical framework allows for a nuanced look 
at how local power dynamics impact returns to Bosnia-Herzegovina (O’Tuthail, 
forthcoming: 23). Through attention to local studies, perhaps critical geopolitics can 
serve aims other than imperialism, despite the role imperialism played in the initial 
creation of geopolitical discourse.   
Section 2.3:  Feminist Critique of Critical Geopolitics 
Feminist geographers argue that critical geopolitics has reproduced rather than 
changed the way geographers study geopolitics (Staeheli, 2001). Feminist political 
geographers have accused critical geopolitics of making many of the same assumptions 
of traditional/classical geopolitics. Specifically, critical geopolitics has been accused of 
focusing on the primacy of the nation-state, privileging elites, adhering to a masculinist, 
Cartesian perspective. Examining the weaknesses of critical geopolitics will reveal what a 
critically feminist geopolitics looks like. 
Some critiques are that the nation-state still functions as the de-facto unit of analysis 
and the public domain is favored over the private (Secor, 2001; Pain, 2009; Gilmartin and 
Kofman, 2004: 121).  Critical geopolitics may not accept the nation-state as a natural unit 
of territory, yet in the critical geopolitical literatures, alternative spatialities of political 
power are often overlooked (Staeheli, 2001: 186).  There is little attention to the 
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household or family and community or regional networks. Although networks are often 
mediated through nation-states, globalization, regionalism and separatism are forces 
challenging state sovereignty (Flint, 2002: 393).  Feminist geographers are concerned 
with analyzing how state power functions or is subverted at multiple scales (Staeheli, 
2001: 186).  Work in feminist geopolitics- or counter-geopolitics- shows the importance 
of examining political life beyond the level of the nation-state. 
In “Toward a Feminist Counter-Geopolitics,” Secor oulines an alternative 
spatialization of politics (2001). She draws from feminist political geography, writing 
that, “feminist approaches show how the (immanently political) categories of public and 
private, global and local, formal and informal, ultimately blur, overlap, and collapse into 
one another in the making of political life (193).” Through investigating daily activities 
of women in Istanbul, Secor shows how the everyday can be political. By decoupling 
geopolitics from the nation-state and global scale, new spaces of political life appear.  
Although critical geopolitics exposes how elites produce geopolitical space, feminist 
political geographers believe critical geopolitics are still elite-centered (Gilmartin and 
Kofman, 2004: 121).   O’Tuathail and Agnew write that ‘wise men’ are not the only 
people shaping geopolitics, they then outline a new class of geopolitical actors who still 
seem to possess class, access to education, and upward mobility. They divide geopolitics 
into two categories, practical and formal, with practical geopoliticians being politicians or 
military officers, and formal geopoliticians being strategic thinkers and public 
intellectuals.  These actors still hold elite positions in a society. Gilmartin and Kofman, 
however, claim people carrying out geopolitical agendas and shaping geopolitical 
imaginations are not always in the government or in elite positions. Although state 
strategy may be defined by elites, Kofman argues that geopolitics needs to be 
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democratized and examined beyond elite attitudes and viewpoints (2004: 121).   
Analyzing geopolitics beyond elites is one of the tasks of feminist critical geopolitics. 
Nick Megoran has examined the way popular culture transmits geopolitical views and 
discourses of danger to youths in Uzbekistan. Pop music is one way that youths 
participate in and embody “a geopolitical script that could be found in learned academic 
tones, the news media, the universities, and in discos and dining rooms across the state, 
binding the population together in a fearful experience of a nation in danger (Megoran, 
2009: 33).”   Secor's work (2001)on feminist geopolitics follows the daily patterns of 
Muslim women in Istanbul, exposing the political livelihood of everyday life.  Musicians 
and women are two categories of political actors missed by classical and critical 
geopolitics.  
Feminist political geographers argue that geopolitics continues to be masculinist.  
But, a feminist geopolitics does not simply involve studying the way women are political 
actors in spatializations of power (Hyndman, 2001: 211).  Dowler and Sharp write that 
“Most specifically, a feminist geopolitics does not simply rewrite women back into 
geopolitical histories. Instead, it offers a lens through which the everyday experiences of 
the disenfranchised can be made more visible (2001: 169).” Geopolitical events may take 
place in war zones, borderlands, and presidential quarters, but they also take place in 
private homes, discos, places of worship, and in communities. Looking in ghettos and 
other places of disenfranchisement, home life, and previously seemingly apolitical spaces 
is the task of feminist political geographers. 
Staeheli argues that geopolitics/ political geographies and feminist geographies do not 
work well together because political geography privileges the global scale and outcomes 
rather than processes (2001).   A feminist geography does not prioritize the global scale, 
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but rather looks at how global, national, or urban scales are related to each other in 
political relationships of power (Hyndman, 2001: 212). However, many critical feminist 
geographers, such as Secor, Pain, and Smith, have asked how global processes shape 
everyday practices in geopolitical analyses. Pain and Smith's edited volume Fear: 
Critical Geopolitics and Everyday Life, looks at the circulation of fear to see how the 
everyday and geopolitical factors influence each other (2009: 3).  Their collections of 
essays follows Dowler and Sharp’s call from 2001 to embody geopolitics and to study 
ways that bodies become represented and entangled in international relations, to  locate 
geopolitics and to give voice to marginalized groups, and to ground geopolitics, finding 
out how international imaginations play out in the everyday life (Pain, 2009: 6). 
What a critically feminist geopolitics offers that a localized geopolitics does not is 
attention to the interaction between geopolitics and everyday life.  Everyday life has 
emerged as an important analytic which counters traditional gridding of space into 
national/local/global scales and public/private boundaries. A localized geopolitics 
privileges the local scale, maintaining dichotomies that alternative geopolitics should 
seek to move beyond. Examining everyday lives involves looking beyond knowledge 
produced at the national level and beyond elites. Looking at everyday life does not mean 
that the nation state disappears as a unit of analysis, but that it is de-centered. Powerful 
elites are not denied their might, but other actors are considered.  Like localized 
geopolitics, critically feminist geopolitics looks at networks of power rather than centers 
of calculation. It is a way to democratize geopolitics by including people and spaces 
previously overlooked in analyses on spatialities of political power, and it moves 
geopolitical analysis away from thinking about space in fixed scales and false binaries of 
public and private.  Although classical geopolitics may be seen as militaristic and critical 
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geopolitics as deconstruction without a reconstruction (Hyndman, 2001: 213), from these 
fields feminist geopolitics emerges.  A feminist geopolitical approach investigates both 
how nation-state level and elite discourses impact daily lives, and how everyday lives 
impact elite discourses.  
Section 2.4:  Geographies of Religion 
Historically, religions have played a large role in the shaping of local, state, and 
international politics.  For example, in the Russian Empire under Nicholas I, the slogan 
“Orthodoxy-autocracy-nationality” served as political ideology (Johnson, 2005 p.30; 
Riasanovsky, 2005 p.362).  In contemporary secular countries, religions still serves as 
powerful social and political forces (West, 2006: 280). In this section of my literature 
review, I am going to review research trends on geographies and critical geographies of 
religion, and overview research being done specifically in the context of Russia. Doing so 
will highlight how my research on Islamic communities contributes to a body of literature 
characterized heavily by attention to the relationship between the state and the Orthodox 
Church in Russia. 
Geographers have made significant contributions to scholarship in the field of 
religion. Cultural geographers like Ellen Semple (1911) have studied how environment 
determines religious imagery, while others like Isaac (1959) have investigated how 
religious motivations transforms landscapes. In her survey on trends in the geographies of 
religion, Kong (1990) cites the study of religion as a superorganic entity affecting the 
landscape as the most common type of research done on the geographies of religion.  
This type of research includes studies on the spatial diffusions of religion, as well as 
distribution and demography.  These analyses are characterized as highly useful in their 
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descriptive nature, but also as amalgamations of facts lacking analytical insight (Kong, 
1990:  362).  
Another strain of research on religion and the cultural landscape is the study of how 
religion affects the physical make-up of landscapes through sacred structures and spaces. 
Geographers have studied the types of sacred structures religious groups such as 
Buddhists or Muslims use to mark their landscape (Kong, 1990: 363).  For example, 
Islam and Noble (1998) discuss mosque architecture and morphology in Bangladesh.  
Building materials and window styles are among some of the elements examined. They 
understand architecture as “the carrier of the social, political, and cultural history of a 
nation (1998: 5),” and examine how mosque architecture changed over time in 
Bangladesh in regards to societal and political shifts. This work moves beyond a 
synthesis of building style through critical attention to architecture’s role in nation-
building. 
Rather than focusing on religion as an element of culture existing in isolation, 
geographers in the 1980s called for studies of the interaction between religious and 
secular agents on the landscape (Kong 1990: 359,364).  The shift from studying religion 
as a superorganic cultural force affecting the landscape to studying religion as part of 
dynamic and contested cultures represents the shift within cultural geography from 
traditional to critical analysis (Kong 1990: 368).  Rather than focusing on the diffusion of 
religion or numbers of worshippers, critical geographers looked at changing symbolism 
and the textuality of religious landscapes. The metaphor of landscape as text is outlined 
Duncan’s book, “The City as Text: The Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the 
Kandyan Kingdom (1990).” In this book, Duncan looks at how the landscape of the 
Kandyan Kingdom was created in such a way to secure, legitimize, and hegemonize the 
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king’s power. What thinking about the landscape as text does is to reveal that the 
landscape is not “innocent.” Rather, it is a result of political and social motivations 
(Duncan, 1990: 13).  The textual, symbolic landscape is an invented tradition serving the 
elites in their creation of imagined communities. Thinking of landscape as text allows the 
script written by elites to be re-written and interpreted in ways independent of the author. 
In this way, cultural, religious landscapes can become a space to ascertain or contest 
power relations. 
The political symbolism of sacred spaces served as a fertile area of focus for cultural 
geographers. Lewandowski studies how the postcolonial Madras state used Hindu 
symbols in renaming places to secure political legitimacy in her analysis of urban 
landscapes (1984).  David Harvey's article, “Monument and Myth (1979),” explores how 
the class struggle between the leftist Paris Commune and the Catholic Church and 
Parisian bourgeoisie in Second-Empire Paris becomes ensconced within the built 
environment.  The titular monument under study is the Sacre-Coeur, a Catholic 
monumental cathedral built in Paris on the hill of Montmarte between 1880 and 1914, a 
time of overt class warfare between workers and royalists.  Also on Montmartre, in 1871, 
Eugene Varlin, a member of the Commune, was beaten and shot by royalists. The Sacre-
Coeur, meant to venerate the sacred heart of Jesus, became for many leftist Parisians 
symbolic of social struggle.  Exploring different myths surrounding the Sacre-Coeur 
shows how sacred spaces cannot be divorced from secular contexts. 
Another area receiving critical attention by geographers is the relationship between 
secular and sacred places in urban space. In her agenda for new geographies of religion, 
Lily Kong writes, “Theories of urban space and society must take on board integrally the 
ways in which socially constructed religious places overlap, complement or conflict with 
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secular places and other socially constructed religious places in the allocation of use and 
meaning (2001: 212).” In other words, geographers need to pay attention to the cultural 
politics of religion, and the various interactions between state powers and religious 
communities in the creation of sacred and secular landscapes. She calls attention to the 
fluidity that can exist between secular and sacred, and wants to investigate how places 
can be infused with dual meanings (Kong, 2001). Although a church may have one set of 
meanings to its congregation, it is seen in a different light by the government. Kong 
outlines this divergence as one between insiders and outsiders. Insiders are individuals 
who go to religious sites for congregation and sacred experiences, and who relate to 
places on an intimate level. She considers the state to be an outsider , which means that it 
views the religious site in terms of functionality rather than spirituality. Factors like 
orderliness and efficiency weigh in over holiness in assigning locations or planning 
demolitions.  The aesthetic value of a holy site may be important to outsiders in the sense 
that it promotes tourism to an area (Kong, 1993: 345-346). Yet, Kong is uncritical in her 
acceptance of the state as purely secular, rather than as mediated through the bodies of 
those working for the government who may possess religious affiliations driving their 
decisions and individual politics. Although the separation of religion and state may be 
something expected of a secular government, it rarely works that way in practice. 
  Importantly, Kong proposes that sacredness is not an essential quality of a place, but 
is created through processes of inclusion and exclusion, and appropriation and 
dispossession (2001: 213).  Her work calls attention to the need to pay attention to social 
and political forces enabling construction or destruction of sacred places. The production, 
of sacred place is one area in which the politics of sacralization have been studied.  Urban 
geographers, for example, have investigated debates on the locations of sacred places of 
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worship or study. Dwyer and Meyer have studied the funding of Islamic schools in 
Western Europe (1995), while Kong has studied the location of religious buildings in 
Singapore (1993).  
In “Negotiating conceptions of sacred space,” Kong studies the tensions between 
religious individuals and the state in the creation of the religious landscape in multi-
confessional Singapore (1993). Although at  the macro-level of the state it appears as if 
there is no conflict between the state and various religious groups, her methodology of 
interviews and in-depth questionnaires reveals various forms of symbolic resistance and 
hegemonic rationalization individuals use to cope with threats to sacred spaces by the 
state (1993).  Her work is also insightful because she studies many different religious 
communities in the context of Singapore, including Islamic, Buddhist, and Chinese 
religionists.  She reveals tensions between the groups and exposes religious harmony in 
Singapore and the secular commitment to multiculturalism as a myth. For example, a 
Hindu feels Islam is more favored by the government due to the many mosques in the 
city, while new Hindu temples are located to the periphery (Kong, 1993: 347).  It appears 
that although there is no state religion in Singapore, some people feel that there is a 
hierarchy of preference of religious groups reflected in the built environment. 
Besides investigating politics of sacralization, anthropologists and geographers have 
also looked at the politics of religious communities. Religious communities have a 
political element to them because they are considered to be “imagined.” Rather than 
being homogenous units clearly separable and different from other groups, the 
boundaries, identity, and differences within communities are constructed, and are always 
being negotiated and contested through everyday life (Kong, 2001: 222).  Religious 
places pay a key role in fostering religious identities (Ehrkamp, 2007: 14). In a study of 
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Hindu-Caribbeans in London, Vertovec (1992) discusses how temples are important 
places in producing and reproducing Caribbean-Indian-Hindu communities through stress 
on congregational activities like worship and activities (Kong, 2001: 223).  Nye (1993) 
writes that there is a dialectical relationship between sacred places and religious 
communities: building a place of worship requires appealing to a community, while the 
place of worship also creates a sense of community (Kong, 2001: 224).  Mills’ work 
(2006) in Kuzguncuk, Istanbul, focuses on how the multiconfessional and multiethnic 
neighborhood landscape is used by Turkish media to create narratives of tolerance and 
belonging, while obscuring narratives of a traumatic minority history and present.  
Examining the interrelated politics of religious place and community making is one way 
geographers contribute to critical studies of religion.  
In her review on works done on geographies of religion in the 1990s, Kong writes 
that geographers should pay attention to looking at not only officially sacred spaces, like 
churches and mosques, but also at other religious structures like houses, schools, 
organizations, and festivals (Kong, 2001: 226). Ehrkamp’s research on Turkish 
immigrants in Duisburg-Marxloh, Germany discusses ways religious identities are 
enacted beyond mosques and in other everyday spaces, like private homes, schools, and 
teahouses (2007).  In order to understand the identity politics of religious communities, it 
is necessary to examine both officially recognized religious spaces, like mosques and 
pilgrimage sights; yet other spaces are also key sights of identity-building (Kong, 2010). 
In the 2000s, there has been increased research focused on the geographies of religion 
(Kong 2010).  This is evidenced by a special section devoted to geographies of religion in 
a 2006 issue of the Annals of the Association of American Geographers.  Ferber and 
Holloway focused on ontological issues on doing research on the geographies of religion.  
 
26 
Ferber (2006) provided a look at the issue of objectivity in research on religion, arguing 
for a move beyond debates on insider/outsider roles of research through encouraging 
reflexivity in research. Holloway (2006) called for research on the geography of beliefs to 
pay attention to affect and embodiment, arguing, “the affectual relations and forms of 
embodiment that produce and are produced in religious-spiritual space must be given 
greater attention if we are to develop more complex and nuanced analyses (186).” In the 
same issue, Ivakhiv (2006) encourages geographers to study the religious and sacred as 
discursive formations impacting how significance is distributed and created across space 
rather than as a term with a stable meaning. Proctor (2006) also wrestles with the 
question of how to define religion, and uses a survey of Americans to search for an 
answer to this question. This special section raised and provided a scholarly debate on 
many important issues facing geographers doing research on religion. 
Geographies of religion have focused on three main strains of research: distribution 
and location of religious places, the politics of creating sacred space, and the identity 
politics of religious communities. Studies of religious communities in Singapore and 
Duisburg-Marxloh have shown the importance of local studies in understanding the 
geographical particularism of a community. These studies reveal difference and 
complexities of religious identities that are often overlooked when researching at the 
scale of the nation-state (Ehrkamp, 2007: 12).  Also, local studies show how a 
community cannot be thought of outside neighborhood, urban, and even transnational 
contexts (Ehrkamp, 2007: 26).  
Section 2.5:  Geographies of Religion in the Russian Federation 
 In order to sit situate my project’s contribution to critical geographies of religion in 
Russia I provide a brief review of literatures on geographies of religion in the Russian 
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context. While some geographers have studied Islam in Russia, most of this research falls 
into the realm of descriptive religious geography, with a focus on demography and 
location of Islam. Forest and Johnson (2001) and Sidorov (2000) have done more critical 
research on the relationship of the Orthodox Church to the politics of place-making in 
Russia.    
Walker and Heleniak  have both contributed scholarship relating to the  size and 
distribution of Muslim communities in Russia (Walker, 2005; Heleniak, 2006). Heleniak 
points out that there is great difficulty in counting the number of members of any 
religious group in Russia due to lack of questions about religion on the Russian census, 
last conducted in 2002 (Heleniak, 2006: 426).  In the absence of census data about 
religious affiliation, Heleniak estimates numbers of Islamic people in Russia by counting 
ethnic groups associated historically with an Islam.  He classifies 56 of the 184 ethnic 
groups counted in the 2002 census as Muslim, and uses data from Russia’s Institute of 
Ethnology and Anthropology to confirm these groups’ affinity with Islam (Heleniak, 
2006: 427).  Conflating religious affiliation with ethnic affiliation provides a rough 
estimate of how many Muslims are in Russia, but fails to count everyone.  There can be 
many pitfalls to this strategy. For example, Tatars are the second largest ethnic group 
after Russians, and the largest group of ethnic Muslims, making up 38% of the ethnic 
Islamic population (Heleniak, 2006: 432). Although many Tatars may be atheist, 
Christian, or agnostic, there are no data collected at the national level in regards to 
religious affiliation and so it is hard to guess the numbers of self-identifying Islamic 
people in Russia.  There are also no numbers on the amount of ethnic Russians which 
practice Islam (Heleniak, 2006: 432).  If we accept that ethnicity and religion go hand in 
hand, there is still discrepancy in collecting data on ethnicity. Many members of minority 
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populations were counted into an “Other” category at the district level, and so it is hard to 
extrapolate how many people in this category fall into ethnic Islamic groups (Heleniak, 
2006: 430).  Also, it is speculated that census fraud and false inflation of population 
occurred in Chechnya in 2002 (Heleniak, 2006: 431).  These discrepancies in counting 
make the rough estimate of Islamic people in Russia vary widely, from 2 million to over 
30 million (Heleniak, 2006: 434; Walker, 2005: 247).  Because the Russian population is 
roughly 145 million, this means Russia has been predicted to be as little as 2 percent or 
up to 21 percent Islamic (Walker, 2005: 247).  Heleniak points out that the positionality 
of the reporting group greatly affects the numbers reported, citing that those who fear the 
influence of Islam in Russia use higher numbers to create an Islamic threat (2006: 434). 
Although Putin reported in 2003 that there were 20 million Muslims in Russia, Heleniak 
could find no information to support his numbers. Notably, Putin presented these 
numbers at a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference as part of his case for 
Russian membership (Walker, 2005: 247). Despite lack of data, Heleniak and Walker 
point out that the 20 million mark has been used in many news sources as a statistic since 
(Heleniak, 2006: 434; Walker, 2005: 247).  
Out of the 83 federal districts of Russia, eight are identified as homelands of Islamic 
people: Adygea, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia,Kabardo-Balkaria, 
Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and Tatarstan (Heleniak, 2006: 429). The Caucasian republics 
of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia have the highest percentage of Islamic 
populations, at 96%, 96.9%, and 98.5% respectively (Heleniak, 2006: 438).  In 
comparing figures from the 1989 USSR census and 2002 Russian census, Heleniak 
shows that although Russia’s population as a whole declined by 2 million people, the 
Islamic population is on the rise. He finds that many Islamic ethnic groups are the 
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youngest in the country, with Chechens and Ingush being the country’s youngest groups 
and the median age of Tatars being below national average (Heleniak, 2006: 432). 
Heleniak writes that the Islamic communities in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan can be seen 
as more ingrained in Russian society, because more Russians live in these territories. For 
example, in Tatarstan in 2002, there was a 53% Tatar and 39% Russian population, and 
in Bashkortostan there was a 30% Bashkir, 14% Tatar, and 36% Russian population 
(Heleniak, 2006: 442). The concentration of Russians in ethnic homelands and also the 
number of Tatars in ethnic Russian territories suggests that these two ethnic groups are 
more willing to intermingle than ethnic Caucasian groups. Heleniak’s work provides an 
analysis on Russian census data to reveal dynamics of the Muslim population.  He 
recognizes the pitfalls of using such data, such as undercount, and the underlying 
motivations for exaggerating or lying about the number of Islamic people in Russia. 
Although he works from data gathered at the national level, he is critical of its collection 
and use. Also, his work provides good background information for understanding the 
distribution, nature, and size of the Russian Islamic population.  
Although most geographical research on Islam in Russia is related to figuring out the 
size and distribution of the group, research on Orthodoxy in Russia focuses more on the 
relationship between the church and state politics. Sidorov (2000) and Forest and 
Johnson(2002) shows how the built environment of Orthodoxy is evident in how the 
secular Russian state and how elite politicians use Orthodoxy to reflect political values 
and create certain national images.  
Sidorov’s article on the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow, Russia, examines 
how a large and prominently-positioned Orthodox church in Russia’s capital shows the 
interplay between scale, politics, and Orthodoxy throughout Russia’s history (Sidorov , 
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2000: 231).  The cathedral was built in the 1890s as a monument to the Patriotic Wars 
against Napoleon and was larger than churches in the Moscow Kremlin (Sidorov, 2000: 
557). In 1931, the cathedral was demolished and a Palace of the Soviets was planned to 
be built in its place. A monument meant to be symbolic of Soviet universal greatness was 
to replace the monument to Russian Orthodox victory over Napoleon. The plans for the 
monument were scrapped due to WWII, and a large pool was built on the site (Sidorov, 
2000: 560).  Local Moscow authorities decided to rebuild the cathedral in 1994; the 
project was sponsored largely out of a loan by the city, which has been repaid by banks 
and businesses (Sidorov, 2000: 565). Although this Cathedral is a national monument, the 
plans to rebuild it were dictated by political elites localized in Moscow, rather than by the 
Russian Ministry of Culture or Orthodox Church (Sidorov, 2000: 562). Sidorov writes, 
“By localizing a national monument, the builders enlarge the scope of the local Moscow 
state (2000: 564).” This account shows how religious spaces can be created for national 
ends and also how Moscow and elites imagine themselves as representative of the whole 
Russian Federation. The iterations of buildings on the site of the Cathedral reveal much 
about political change within Russia (Sidorov, 2000: 568). The newest Cathedral shows 
the expansive role of Moscow in the political state, as well as a desire to continue the 
association of the Russian state with Orthodoxy.  
Forest and Johnson’s work on post-Soviet identity transformation in Russia also 
involves interrogating transformations in memorial landscapes. They use the 
constructivist school of nationalism and the literature on landscape as text to study how 
elites in Moscow have transformed Soviet-era monuments to shape a certain type of 
Russian national imaginary. They argue that: 
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the physical transformation of places of memory during critical junctures reflects 
the struggle among political elites for the symbolic capital embodied in and 
represented by these sites. By co-opting, contesting, ignoring, or removing certain 
types of monuments, political elites engage in a symbolic dialogue with each 
other and with the public in an attempt to gain prestige, legitimacy, and influence 
(2002: 525). 
Many monuments were taken down, transformed, or re-dedicated in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the USSR in 1991. Forest and Johnson develop a three-part schema to classify 
the fates of  monuments: Co-opted/Glorified, Disavowed, or Contested. (Forest and 
Johnson, 2002: 530).  While monuments to Lenin are considered contested within Russia, 
because some have been removed while others remain, World War II memorials fall 
under the category of Co-opted and Glorified. Other places falling into this category are 
associated with Russian Orthodoxy and pre-1917 Russian culture (2002: 534). Because 
Orthodox churches fall into the category of monuments which elites seek to co-opt and 
glorify in order to gain influence with Moscow’s public, Forest and Johnson’s work 
shows the symbolic role the Orthodox church plays in the creation of a wider Russian 
imaginary. The politics of sacralizing Orthodox space is seen as important for legitimacy, 
at least within Moscow. 
Forest and Johnson’s research supports Sidorov’s arguments that the local Moscow 
state plays an expansive role in the Russian Federation. Although their work focuses on 
Russian nation-building via the built environment, they do not specify if they understand 
Russian to refer to an ethnic group or to a citizenship category.  There is little research on 
Islamic and other minorities’ identity-formation, or reclamation of historical mosques and 
Islamic/minority monuments in Russia. There is also little research on the interaction of 
the state and Islamic religious groups within Russia. Perhaps, the elites in Moscow are 
not focused on the symbolic capital associated with historical Islamic sites in Russia.  
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Yet, I argue that moving outside of Moscow will reveal the symbolic capital of 
minorities’ religious landscapes and the role that the state plays in shaping them. 
Section 2.6:  Studying Islam in Astrakhan 
The bodies of literature outlined above inform my project. I have adopted a critical 
feminist geopolitical stance  in order to understand how communities of faith function as 
political actors in contemporary Russia and how the everyday and local spaces of 
religious life are impacted by state power at the national, regional, and local scales. I turn 
to the critical geographies of religion to understand the politics of making sacred space 
and to understand the role of religious places in community-building. Looking closely at 
how religious communities and the state interact in the creation or destruction of the 
Islamic landscape of Astrakhan shows how geopolitical motivations impact sacred 
spaces. My approach is characterized by the following themes: 
• In keeping with the suggestion by O’Tuathail (forthcoming) to conduct locality 
studies in geopolitical research, as well as Ehrkamp’s (2007) and Kong’s (1993) 
critical religious geographical research done locally, my analysis of Islamic 
community building in Russia is an in-depth analysis at Islamic communities in 
the local context of Astrakhan. Of particular concern is an analysis of the 
historical and contemporary landscape of Islam in the city. 
• My localized approach does not mean that I replace a privileging of research at 
the national level with research on a micro-level. Rather, by examining the 
political life of local communities, I show how various places and scales of state 
and other powers interact in the creation of Islamic communities within 
Astrakhan.  I show how Islamic communities in Astrakhan are embedded in 
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networks of state and other forms of power. 
•  By choosing Astrakhan as a site, I am following critical and feminist geopolitical 
calls to move out of the capital city. My research is not in one of the ethnic 
homelands of Islamic people, but rather based in a multi-cultural provincial 
capital. This move is inspired by Kong’s work in multi-confessional Singapore 
and a desire to study Islam in a Russia imagined as ethnically and spiritually 
diverse, rather than as a homogeneous nation-state.  
In the following chapter, I discuss my site, Astrakhan, in-depth and outline my 
methodology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
Chapter 3:  Introduction to Site and Research Methods 
In this chapter, I introduce the reasons for selecting Astrakhan as the site for 
investigating my research questions, and provide background on the history and 
development of Islam in Astrakhan.  I then turn to outlining my research methods which 
include archival research and interviews with leaders of mosque communities in 
Astrakhan. 
Section 3.1:  Site Selection: Astrakhan, Russia 
One overlap between critical geopolitics and critical geographies of religion is the call 
for empirical, local studies (O’Tuathail, forthcoming, Kong, 2001) and a rejection of 
formal political arenas as sites of inquiry (Sharp, 2004: 94). In selecting Astrakhan, I 
followed O’Tuathail’s recommendation for geographers interested in critical geopolitical 
research to move out of capital cities. Also, much research on the relationship of religion 
and state in Russia is based in Moscow (Sidorov, 2001, Forest and Johnson, 2002).  
Privileging Moscow as a research site would make me complicit in expanding the 
political scope of the Moscow state (Sidorov, 2001).  Because my research is, in a sense, 
about understanding the reaches and limits of the Kremlin’s power, I did not choose to 
research the sizeable Islamic community within Moscow and instead turned to Astrakhan. 
Part of the reason Astrakhan serves as a good field site is its provincial locale- it is 
located approximately halfway between Tehran, Iran and Moscow at the Volga River 
Delta near the Caspian Sea.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the distance between Astrakhan Oblast 
and Moscow, while Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 illustrate Astrakhan’s situational location at 
the intersection of the Middle East and Eastern Europe.    
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Figure 3.1: Astrakhan Oblast (highlighted). (Map by Jeff Levy, University of Kentucky.) 
 
Although Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan, the traditional homeland of the largest 
ethnic Islamic minority in Russia, I wanted to study Russian Islamic communities outside 
of this historical core. Inspired by Kong’s research in multi-confessional Singapore, I 
 
36 
wanted to go to a diverse city within Russia. The Caucasian republics of Ingushetia, 
Chechnya, and Dagestan are not as religiously or ethnically diverse as Astrakhan 
(Heleniak, 2006). Because of the Chechen war and a desire to examine the government’s 
relationship with non-separatist Islamic groups, I also wanted to go to a place where 
moderate Islam was the dominant form practiced. Astrakhan also makes a good site for 
studying Islamic-community building in Russia because of its multi-ethnic and multi-
confessional character.  In the following section, I provide a historical overview of 
Astrakhan. 
 
Figure 3.2  Astrakhan in the Caspian Sea Region. (Map by Dick Gilbreath, University of 
Kentucky.) 
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Figure 3.3: Astrakhan (underlined) in the context of the Middle East and Eastern Europe. 
(Map by Dick Gilbreath, University of Kentucky.)  
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From Hajji-Tarkhan to Astrakhan  
In 2008, Astrakhan celebrated its 450th anniversary. During my fieldwork in 2009, 
banners were still hung up all over the city, marking this milestone anniversary. 
However, as an interviewee said as he took me on a driving tour of the old town, 
“Astrakhan is much, much older (July 2009).”  Reviewing the historical and political 
geographies of Astrakhan will reveal how Astrakhan earned its reputation as a cultural 
melting pot.  
Historically, Astrakhan was called Xacitarxan, or Hajji-Tarkhan. Astrakhan’s name 
has Turkish origins: ‘hajj’ refers to a governor or leader, and the Islamic pilgrimage to 
Mecca, while and ‘tarkhan’ means untaxed. The city was not taxed by the Golden Horde 
(Everett-Heath 2005). Hajji Tarkhan was a provincial city in the Golden Horde. The 
city’s first recorded mention is in the 1330s, in the travels of Ibn Battuta (Battuta 2005).  
Ibn Battuta, an explorer and Berber Islamic scholar from Morocco, visited Astrakhan on 
his way to Sarai. Sarai was the capital city of the khans of the Golden Horde, and was 
located north of Astrakhan and on the Great Silk Road trading route.  Of Hajji-Tarkhan, 
Battuta wrote, “It is one of the finest cities, with great bazaars, and is built on the river Itil 
(Volga), which is one of the great rivers of the world (2005: 151).” Although Hajji-
Tarkhan was not on the Silk Route, it was a key trade center. In fact, the city’s Russified 
name, Astrakhan, was used to refer to fur brought to Russia from Central Asian trade 
(Everett-Heath, 2005). 
In 1395, Hajji-Tarkhan and Sarai were destroyed by Tamerlane, a Mongol from 
Central Asia who sought to re-establish the Mongol empire. In his quest to rebuild the 
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Mongol Empire, Tamerlane sought to destroy the Islamic Golden Horde.  The cities were 
rebuilt, although the Golden Horde never re-united and split into smaller khanates.  Hajji-
Tarkhan became the capital city of the Astrakhan Khanate . The khanate existed from the 
1460s to 1556, and the population was mainly Tatar and Nogais, an Islamic Turkic ethnic 
group (Ozturkler).   
Ivan the Terrible and Boris Godunov in Astrakhan 
In 1556, Ivan the Terrible captured Hajj-Tarkistan, four years after he conquered 
Kazan.   Hence, 1558 is considered by the Russian state as the marker of Astrakhan’s 
age. A strong connection exists between state power and architecture (Rowland, 2003: 
35), as evidenced in the building of Archangel Michael Cathedral in the Kremlin.  State 
power also impacted the architecture of the newly rebuilt Astrakhan, despite its distance 
from Moscow. 
Although Ivan the Terrible defeated the khanate of Astrakhan, he was not responsible 
for the large amount of building projects happening in the lower Volga region. Rather, 
Boris Godunov, a boyar, planned and sponsored many of these projects in his quest for 
power. The Kremlin of Astrakhan was built starting in 1558. The walls were built with 
masonry and bricks scavenged from the ruins of Sarai. The height of the walls span from 
7-11.3 meters, and there are 8 towers on the kremlin. Notably, the Astrakhan Kremlin 
was built in a similar style to others in Moscow and Smolensk (located in Imperial 
Russia’s western frontier). Godunov’s repetition of architectural style shows a desire to 
create a symbolic union of the Russian state (Rowland, 2003: 38). Importantly, Godunov 
sponsored an Orthodox cathedral to be built within the Astrakhan Kremlin in 1600. The 
Dormition Cathedral in the Astrakhan Kremlin was architecturally and spiritually based 
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on churches in the Moscow Kremlin.  The cathedral symbolized the sanctity of Moscow’s 
troops in their quest to dominate the Islamic khanates of the Volga region (Rowland, 
2003: 38) and the Kremlin showed the strength of the Russian state. By sponsoring such 
projects, Godunov sought to show not only his own wealth, but the strength and piety of 
his clan (Rowland, 2003: 35).  In order to be comparable to the Rurikid clan (the clan of 
Ivan the Terrible), Godunov had to build quickly and he had to build strategically. He 
sought to establish his legitimacy to power through architecture, and it worked.  In 1598, 
when Ivan the Terrible’s handicapped son, Fyodor the Bellringer, proved incapable of 
ruling or producing an heir, Russia needed a new ruling dynasty.  Gudonov claimed the 
ruling position, and became tsar. And, the Dormition Cathedral and the Kremlin 
dominated and continue to dominate the Astrakhan skyline from their strategic location 
on top of a hill(Figure 3.4).
 
Figure 3.4: 17th Century Astrakhan. (Rambaud’s Russia, 1898.) 
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While the Kremlin and Dormition Cathedrals became the visual centers of 
Astrakhan’s religious and state landscape, Islam and other forms of faith continued to be 
practiced in the city. Despite using church architecture to proclaim the symbolic defeat of 
Islam, Godunov did not want to cripple the trade industry in Astrakhan. Godunov set up 
an infrastructure for trade in the city, building covered Persian and Bukhara markets on 
the outskirts of the kremlin, and later on establishing Indian, Tatar, and Armenian 
markets. Because of the desire to promote multinational trade, a multi-confessional 
infrastructure was also built. Mosques and Armenian churches were constructed near the 
markets and in the Tatar suburbs (Rowland, 2003: 38). While the kremlin and church 
were key political symbols, Godunov’s desire to link Russian trade to a wider region 
allowed a new Islamic landscape to be built. Even though the landscape of Moscow 
traveled to Astrakhan, Astrakhan’s situation on the Volga Delta ensured that the cultural 
and spiritual diversity of the region would continue. 
Islam in the Soviet Era 
Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Astrakhan was home to many different religions. 
However, the rise of the Communist Party and Stalinism greatly altered the religious 
communities and landscapes within the city and the Soviet Union as a whole. The 
Communist Party promoted atheism, and there was no official state religion.  In this 
section I am going to provide a broader overview of what happened to Islam in Russia as 
a whole and then Astrakhan in particular.  
Before the Soviet period, Orthodoxy and the Russian state were constitutive of each 
other.  The Russian state was seen as the protector of Orthodoxy and bore the political 
ideology of, “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality” (Johnson 2005, 3). In the Bolshevik 
revolution, all three parts of this slogan were under attack. The Orthodox Church was 
 
42 
targeted, as was the monarchy. The Government Decree of 1918 on the Separation of the 
Church from the State and the School from the Church sought to crush the monarchy 
through dissociating the Orthodox Church from the State (Yemelianova, 2002: 103). In 
the early Soviet period, Islam was not a target of the Communist Party. Politicians stated 
that they viewed there to be no conflict between Islam and Soviet rule, and the Soviet 
government returned mosque properties confiscated by the tsar back to their communities 
in Orenburg, the Caucuses, and Kazan (Yemelianova, 2002: 103). 
After World War II, some churches and mosques reopened, and holy texts could be 
printed (Johnson, 2005: 7).  Although the Soviet period of Russian history was not one 
where religions flourished, communities of faith still existed. However, many ethnic 
groups were deported to GULAG from 1943-45, such as Chechens, Ingush, and the 
Buddhist Kalmyks. Religious leaders not in tune with Soviet policies were deported 
(Johnson 2005).  
As in the rest of the USSR, the Soviet period was one of religious repression in 
Astrakhan. In the 1930s, most churches and mosques were shut down or re-purposed 
(Syzranov, 2007: 70).. St. Vladimir’s cathedral, located outside of the kremlin, served as 
a bus station, while the White Mosque became a suitcase factory and the Persian mosque 
a clothing factory (Syzranov, 2007: 71). The Green Mosque was shut down and turned 
over to the city under cultural and social needs (Syzranov, 2007: 71). The cross at the top 
of the kremlin was replaced with an antenna, symbolizing the end of state-Orthodox 
relations. Six mosques were still opened at the end of the 1930s, and only four mosques 
at the end of 1954 (Syzranov, 2007: 71).  According to an interviewee, an elderly Islamic 
scholar who worked at the Red mosque before the Soviet collapse, only old men came to 
services. 
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Islam in Astrakhan after the Soviet Collapse 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many mosques have been returned to local 
communities of faith.  The four independent mosques that operated in the Soviet period 
united to form the Astrakhan Regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims (RDUM) in 
1991.   After 1990, there are 80 mosques in the Astrakhan region. Every city has one or 
two mosques, except the capital, which has over 30 mosques (interviews and various 
organizations state that there are from 32-39 mosques).  Six mosques dating from before 
the 1917 revolution have been returned to Islamic communities and restored. Many of 
these historic mosques were located in the historic Tatar suburb, located outside of the 
downtown and Kremlin.  In a tour of the Red Mosque, an Islamic scholar put emphasis 
on the wide age range of attendees at a madressah, stating that community members 
between 5-80 attend Arabic and Koran lessons on Sundays. And, a halal meat kiosk is 
located outside of the Red Mosque. The built landscape reflects a religious revival of 
Islam within Astrakhan. Visiting some of the mosques in-depth will reveal the dynamic 
nature of Astrakhan’s Islamic community. 
Red/Central Mosque: 
The central mosque (Figure 3.5) was built in 1898, funded by a Tatar mullah, Abd al-
Vakhlab Aliev, and a Tatar merchant, Shakir Kazakov. The mosques within Astrakhan 
have many names. This mosque has been called “Krasnaya” or red because of the color 
of the minaret, and also Kazanskaya. Kazankskaya refers to the city of Kazan, the Tatar 
home territory. This mosque was opened in 1950 during the Soviet period, and was a 
center of worship in the Soviet period. Today, it is the head mosque of the Astrakhan 
Regional Spiritual Board of Muslims. The mosque conducts services in Arabic, Russian, 
and Tatar languages, reflecting the multiethnic composition of attendees. Between 500-
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600 worshippers show up on Friday services. This mosque is also home to small 
madressehs which teach lessons on the Koran and Arabic. Importantly, a photograph of 
Putin shaking hands with the mufti is on display in both the front office of the mosque 
and also in the small Islamic shop located outside the mosque. A halal meat kiosk is 
located outside the mosque’s gates (Interviews, July 2009; Syzranov, 2007; Astrakhan 
Travel Guide, 2008). 
  
Figure 3.5: Red Mosque and Halal Meat Kiosk 
  
White Mosque: 
This mosque (Figure 3.6) is known the White Mosque because of the color of its 
minaret. Before the Soviet era, it was considered the main mosque of the Tatars 
(Syzranov, 2007: 55). This mosque served as a suitcase factory in the Soviet era, but was 
handed back to the community in the 1990s. Renovations began in 2001, and the mosque 
opened up in 2007. The mosque was partly funded through donations from Kazan, local 
businesses, as well as a half a million ruble contribution from the Astrakhan government. 
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It is located a block away from the Red Mosque in the historic Tatar neighborhood, and is 
considered a historical monument. (Interviews, July 2009; Syzranov, 2007; Astrakhan 
Travel Guide, 2008). 
 
Figure 3.6: White Mosque. (“Churches and Mosques in Astrakhan: White Mosque,” 
2008.) 
 
Mosque 34: 
This mosque (Figure 3.7) is located on a highway near the Astrakhan airport. The 
mosque was ordered to be demolished in 2006 by the mayor, but its community has 
refused to demolish the mosque. The city government believes the community has 
violated zoning laws and built the mosque illegally, while the community believes they 
are being discriminated against for building a mosque on a major gateway to the city 
(Interview, July 2009). They have sued the government at the local, regional, and 
national level for the right to build. Their case is waiting to be heard in the European 
Court of Human Rights (Interview, July 2009).  
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Figure 3.7: Mosque 34 
Section 3.2:  Research Methods 
I adopted several methods to answer my research questions on the role of the state 
and other entities in shaping the landscape of Islam in Astrakhan.  By approaching 
questions from multiple angles, validity is increased and different perspectives are given 
consideration (Winchester and Rof, 2005.)  Also, I can show how my local study, while 
not generalizable, is also not anecdotal, and has implications for understanding wider 
issues of how geopolitical motivations influence the Russian government's attempts at 
regulating Islam (Sharp, 2004: 96).  Mixing methods allowed me to move beyond 
traditional geopolitical methods of analyzing state documents and supports a 
democratization of geopolitics by giving voice and methodological consideration to non-
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elites and non-governmental actors (Gilmartin and Kofman, 2004).  Specifically, methods 
for this research project included: 
• In-depth, semi-structured interviews with members of Islamic 
communities. 
 
• Archival research of Russian and other newspapers and scholarship from 
2000 and beyond. 
 
• Archival research of governmental and nongovernmental documents from 
2000 onwards, with a focus on organizations studying freedom of religion 
in Russia. 
 
I was a student at a local university, and lived in sweltering Astrakhan for eight weeks 
in June and July 2009. During this period I conducted interviews for this research. 
Archival research and discourse analysis were conducted in the summer and fall of 2009.  
The year 2000 was chosen as a starting point for archival research because it is the year 
that marks the beginning of Putin’s presidency. Putin’s rule has been associated with the 
centralizing of power in the Kremlin (Sukhov, 2008) and is an appropriate time frame 
since this project investigates relationships between the Kremlin and periphery.  Site 
visits, interviews, and archives provided me the appropriate materials needed for an 
analysis of the landscape of Islam in Astrakhan. 
Interviews 
In Astrakhan, I was able to conduct seven interviews with members of Islamic 
communities. In-depth, semi-structured interviews are appropriate research methods 
because the information sought (about ideas and practices of Islam and the state) is 
qualitative and non-standardized (Baxter and Eyles, 1999). I started out using an on-site 
recruiting approach (Secor, 2010) by visiting mosques and asking members to participate 
in interviews. Although there are 39 mosques in the oblast, I was able to interview 
members at two mosques. This is because whenever I inquired to interview members, I 
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was referred constantly back to the mosque which served as the central mosque of one of 
Astrakhan’s Islamic communities. And, once at the mosque, I was referred to interview 
the same members of the congregation. Often, members asked for permission from the 
mufti, the head Islamic scholar of the community and most powerful leader of the 
congregation before they could interview with me. Because of this time-consuming 
process, and the fact I was only able to be in Astrakhan for two months, I was not able to 
conduct as many interviews as desired.  In another instance, I used the snowball 
technique (Secor, 2010) and was able to conduct interviews at a mosque located on the 
outskirts of the city. Because of the importance hierarchy and permissions played in my 
research, I interviewed primarily members holding prominent positions within the 
Islamic community, such as mullahs and imams. Although I aimed for gender equality in 
my research, I was only able to conduct one interview with a woman leader. My 
interviews with these leaders gave me an insider’s perspective on the relationship 
between the state and Islamic communities.  
Interviews were semi-structured in order to create a natural flow of conversation 
(Secor, 2010). A guide with several key questions (Appendix 1) was initially used to 
structure interviews. However, many people I interviewed volunteered to meet on 
multiple occasions. At follow-up meetings, once I had exhausted questions from my 
guide, interviews became very informal and driven by interviewees. Interviews were held 
in the locations of the interviewee’s choosing and often occurred at mosques or 
restaurants. They were conducted in Russian and English. Although I asked for forty-five 
minutes of time, interview length varied from one to three hours. I asked to tape record 
conversations, but all but one interviewee declined. Therefore I took copious notes during 
conversations and also typed them up immediately after the interviews. Interviews were 
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structured for me to understand characteristics of mosques, the mobility and education of 
the interviewee, how Islam has developed in Astrakhan, and the interviewee’s opinion on 
the relationship between Islam and the state. 
Archival research 
Another method I used was archival research of relevant documents related to the 
relationship between Islam and the Russian state.  Relevant documents were tracked 
down through search engines, such as Lexis-Nexis.  I searched for key terms like Islam, 
Russia, Astrakhan, mosque, and more specific terms and sites as research went on. Also, 
I tracked down relevant sources by visiting the websites of several NGOs, news service 
providers, and the local and national government. My browsing research led me to many 
serendipitous finds (Rose, 2001: 143). 
Relevant information came from such disparate sources as Forum 18, a Norwegian-
Danish Christian News service, an open letter from the Islamic community of Russia to 
President Putin, and International Religious Freedom reports. I collected approximately 
15 news articles and 60 press releases from the Astrakhan.net, a local news site, and 
Astrobl.ru, the web site of the regional government. I read holiday greetings and 
transcripts of annual meetings between the Russian president and Islamic leaders from 
2000-2010, as well as over 30 articles from national newspapers, including Pravda and 
Izvestaya Gazeta. Besides articles from these sources, I also consulted Astrakhan travel 
guides, local history books, and scholarship from another geographer, Kimitaka 
Matsuzato.  Matsuzato also conducted research on Islam in Astrakhan. Besides these 
textual sources, I also thought of the archive as visual (Rose, 2001; Schein, 1997: 225). I 
visited several key sites, like mosques, graveyards, and I also looked for older 
photographs (Rose, 2001). Overall, my archival resources are eclectic. As Gillian Rose 
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writes, “eclecticism is demanded by the intertextuality of the discourse (2001: 143).” The 
discourse surrounding Islamic- Russian relations are articulated through a variety of texts 
and images, and so I tried to gather a wide variety of materials. 
Discourse Analysis 
After gathering together my interviews and archival materials, I tried to analyze the 
discourses surrounding the relationship of the state and other entities in shaping Islamic 
communities within Russia. Nicholas Green writes, “Discourse is a coherent pattern of 
statements across a range of archives and sights (quoted in Rose, 2001: 143).” I 
performed a narrative analysis of my interviews, looking at how the stories interviewees 
told me about how their community were constructed and content analysis, tracking key 
themes across interviews (Secor, 2010: 202) I tried to understand the official discourse on 
the relationship of Islam and the state by examining governmental sources, as well as 
investigate how these discourses were subverted or present in other materials.  Rather 
than searching for total explanations or fixed truths, I tried to see how my interview texts 
related to or challenged broader discourses found in archival research (Secor, 2010). I 
was especially interested with the discourses surrounding the built environment of Islam 
in Astrakhan. As Kong’s work shows, the politics of sacralization is a key site of 
intersection between secular governments and religious communities (2001). I treated the 
landscape of Islam in Astrakhan as “discourse materialized” (Schein 1997: 663). The 
Islamic landscape, characterized by mosques, halal meat kiosks, and shops, can be 
viewed as the material manifestation of the politics on the place of Islam within Russia. 
Rather than being simply a product of this discourse, the landscape of Islam is also part 
of the development, reproduction, and/or subversion of the discourse (Schein 1997: 663).   
 
51 
Chapter 4:  Contemporary Discourses on State-Islamic Relationships at the National and 
Local Level: Tolerance and Building; Intolerance and Demolition 
Almost twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation 
struggles to balance its commitment to secularism with its historical ties to Orthodoxy 
(Warhola, 2007).  Meanwhile, state-Islamic relations have been an area of crisis for the 
nation since the first and second Chechen Wars, with the Chechen guerillas challenging 
the sovereignty of the federation (German, 2003: 12-13).  Since Putin’s presidency in 
2000, state discourses on Islam have been split into two main threads: the state’s 
disapproval of Islamic extremism at home and abroad, and the state’s protective role in 
fostering Islamic community-building in its multi-confessional borders (Hahn, 2007: 54; 
Konarovsky, 2000: 188).  Textual analysis of newspaper articles and transcripts from 
meetings between Islamic and Russian officials demonstrate these two overarching 
discourses on state-Islamic relations. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine these 
two threads of discourse in detail; my analysis here will focus on the relationship between 
the state and “official” Islam. “Official” refers to Islamic communities which participate 
in the three national-level Islamic structures within Russia: the Central Spiritual Board of 
(TsDUM), the Council of Muftis of Russia, and the Coordinating Council of the Muslims 
of the Northern Caucasus (Matsuzato, 2007). Before examining the national scale 
production of Islamic communities as friend of the Russian state, I will briefly address 
questions of secularism and the Russian state’s relationship to the Orthodox Church. 
Section 4.1:  Secularism and the Russian State 
In order to study state-Islamic relations within the Russian Federation, it is necessary 
to understand how secularism is produced in Russia.  Although secularism can be 
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uncritically understood as the separation of religion from the state, Asad’s genealogy of 
the secular shows that secularism is not a universal concept, but one that is situated in 
histories and places (2003). Secularism cannot be uncritically and evenly applied, and 
thus close attention must be played to how secularism is enacted.  In Russia, as I show 
below, the state is not able to exist in a separate space from faith, but is rather composed 
of individuals with beliefs and official documents reflecting religious histories and 
moralities.  Analyzing laws and presidential speeches and meetings illustrates how and 
what kind of secularism is institutionalized in Russia. My textual analysis shows that 
Orthodoxy influences national- level politics in Russia in a way other religions do not. 
 
Figure 4.1: Medvedev and Patriarchate Kirill, Christmas. (Vladimir 
Rodionov/Kremlin/RIA Novosti/Reuters, January 6, 2010.) 
  
In Figure 4.1, President Medvedev shakes hands with the leader of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill on Orthodoxy Christmas Day at the Christ the Savior 
Church in Moscow. Christ the Savior is the largest Orthodox Church in Russia, and as 
Sidorov writes, “a powerful symbol of the presumed break with the Soviet past and the 
beginning of yet another epoch of Russian society (2001: 194).”  Presidents of secular 
nation-states often attend and hold religious celebrations. Images of state leaders 
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attending services remind one that the state is composed of individuals, whose religious 
beliefs may influence their politics.  Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev both 
identify as Orthodox.  Putin was the first leader of Russia to publicly confess his belief in 
the Church since 1917, and Medvedev received publicly televised endorsement from the 
Russian Orthodox Church leader, Patriarch Alexy, on Christmas Eve after he had 
announced his candidacy (Osipovich, 2008). In order to show how faith affects secular 
politics, I first discuss Russia’s laws on the separation of state and religion as well as 
presidential addresses on Orthodox holidays. I then compare these to Putin’s presidential 
Ramadan greetings from 2000 and 2006. A comparison in language used towards the two 
groups highlights differences in how the state treats the religious groups.  
One of the most important state-Orthodox discourses is the special role of Orthodoxy 
in the history of forming the Russian state. Adopted in 1993, the Constitution of Russia 
declares the Russian state to be a secular and liberal multi-national federation, prohibiting 
discrimination based on ethnicity, race, or religion. Article 14 of the constitution reads: 
1. The Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No religion may be established 
as the State religion or as obligatory. 
2. Religious associations shall be separate from the State and shall be equal before 
the law. 
Although no religion is supposed to be state-sponsored, Orthodoxy receives special 
attention in federal laws.  The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious 
Associations was introduced with this statement: 
  The Federation Assembly of the Russian Federation,  
affirming the right of each person to freedom of conscience and freedom of 
religious profession, as well as to equality before the law irrespective of religious 
affiliation and convictions;  
considering that the Russian federation is a secular state;  
recognizing the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the establishment of the state 
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system of Russia and to the development of its spirituality and culture;  
respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religions, 
constituting an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia;  
striving to facilitate the strengthening of cooperation of the state with religious 
associations that exist in the Russian federation and enjoying public support;  
considering it important to cooperate in the achievement of mutual understanding, 
toleration, and respect in matters of freedom of conscience and freedom of 
religious profession;  
adopts the present federal law. (1997, Sept. 16 Rossijskaya Gazeta , Issue 179). 
 
The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations was signed by 
Yeltsin, and regulates the formation and functions of religious associations, 
organizations, and groups within Russia. These two documents, the constitution and 
federal law, seemingly contradict each other. Orthodoxy is placed on another level of 
historical and spiritual status than other religions with the Russian government (Walker, 
2005: 253).  Although the law recognizes other religions within Russia, Orthodoxy is not 
placed in the same clause, making it seem as if it has a special place within the law rather 
than an equal status. Although Orthodoxy was practically synonymous with Russian 
dynasties before communism (Johnson, 2006; Rowland, 2003), Russian history is not 
merely that of the ruling family, but is multiethnic and includes histories of Islamic and 
animist peoples as well (Kappeler, 2001). 
This sentiment is repeated in Dmitri Medvedev’s address at Christ the Savior in 
Moscow on the occasion of the 1020th anniversary of the baptism of Rus. He stated:   
The conversion of Prince Vladimir and the whole of Rus to Orthodoxy were of 
truly historic significance and played a fundamental part in shaping our state’s 
development. The decision was motivated in large part by the need to unite the 
divided eastern Slavic tribes and a number of other ethnic groups. A desire for 
statehood based on a completely new spiritual foundation emerged among them. 
Finally, the adoption of Christianity did much to help our forefathers become part 
of the processes taking place in Europe and the world and amounted in essence to 
a choice of civilisation. It changed not only the rules of social conduct and family 
life but transformed state life in its entirety. The adoption of Christianity enabled 
the ancient Russian state to engage in dialogue with other countries as an equal, 
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and it enriched ancient Russian culture with the universal values of the Bible. 
Many of these values form the foundation of the humanistic ideals we share with 
Europe (June 29, 2008). 
 
Here, Medvedev affirms that Russia owes its moral values, as well as political values, 
to the Orthodox Church. He links Russia’s conversion to Orthodoxy as a starting point to 
statehood which culminates in the formation of the Federation. Orthodoxy and the Bible 
are depicted as proxies by which Russia gains its European character. This statement by 
the president of a seemingly secular country reveals how important past relationships 
between the church and state can be for contemporary national identities. 
Medvedev’s statements on the special role of Orthodoxy in Russian history have 
received little criticism in Russian media. However, when a Muslim leader tried to call 
attention to the role the Golden Horde played in forming the Russian state, he was 
heavily criticized in national media outlets by Russian historians. At the International 
Conference “Russia and the Islamic World: the Partnership for the Sake of Stability,” in 
September 2009, Gainutdin, leader of the Council of Muftis in Russia, repeated historian 
Karamzin’s quotation, “Moscow owes its greatness to the khans,” notably adding that, 
“This assessment also applies to Russia as a whole (Zaitseva, 2009).” He proposes that 
the modern, multi-ethnic state has its predecessor in Volga Bulgaria, the territorial 
formation of the Golden Horde and Turkic Tatars. His claims run counter to Medvedev’s 
assertions that Russian progress is tied with its Orthodox history, rather tying state 
development with Islamic-Orthodox relations under leadership of the khans.  
Also, in his speech, Gainutdin proposes that Moscow developed into the cultural, 
political, and spiritual capital of Russia due to the will of the khans in the horde. Tying 
Islamic history to the future of the Federation, Gainutdin also quotes Tatar philosopher 
Ismail-bey Gasprinsky, stating “In the future, perhaps, not far, Russia is destined to 
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become one of the major Muslim states,” adding “we all can testify how true this 
prophecy has turned out to be: present-day Russia, if one takes into consideration the 
dynamics of the development of its Muslim community is in fact a significant Muslim 
country (Zaitseva, 2009).” His audience was the international Islamic community, yet his 
words became scrutinized in the Russian press.  
Representatives from the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as the Mufti of Perm, 
stated in interviews with Blagovest and  Interfax-Religion, two  Russian non-
governmental news agencies, that the Golden Horde did not play a crucial role in 
contemporary Russian state formation (Zaitseva, Sept. 29 2009; Interfax, 2009). 
According to historian Igor Froyanov, the Russian state became strong in spite of the 
Golden Horde: 
Not because of the Golden Horde did Russia emerge as a powerful unified state, 
but against it, in the struggle with the Tatars a Russian single state was forged. 
The struggle against very dangerous foreign enemies raised, I believe the issue - 
to be or not to be the Russian ethnos. Therefore it was necessary to all of its 
resources, all its reserves, all of its resources to gather in one fist. The struggle  
implemented the principality of Moscow…And there is great historical role of 
Moscow. (Interfax Sept 25, 2009).   
 
By analyzing the negative response in newspapers to Gainutdin’s claims of the 
importance of the Golden Horde for the contemporary Russian state, as compared to the 
non-response to claims of Orthodoxy’s contributions in the constitution and presidential 
speeches, one sees that historical discourse is not neutral. Foucault writes, “War is waged 
throughout history, and through the history that tells the history of war” (Foucault 1997: 
173). There is never an impartial or objective historical knowledge.  In the Russian 
secular state, Orthodoxy is imagined as victor in the wars with the Golden Horde, and as 
a contributor to Russian progress. Meanwhile, similar claims about the contributions of 
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the Golden Horde are met with dissent.  Although a discourse highlighting the 
relationship between the church and state in Russian statehood is produced by the state, a 
negative discourse is produced in the media on the contributions of Tatar ancestors.  
The special role of Orthodoxy in Russia’s history is an important marker of state-
church relations. Also important is the discourse surrounding the morality that Orthodoxy 
affords the Russian state. In a Christmas greeting to Orthodox Church members during 
his first year as president, Putin stated: 
Orthodoxy has traditionally played a special role in the history of Russia. It has 
not only served as a moral compass for every believer, but also as an unbending 
spiritual pivot for the entire people and the state. Based on the idea of love for thy 
neighbour, and on the commandments of goodness, mercy and justice, Orthodoxy 
in many respects has determined the character of Russian civilization. Its eternal 
truths, which have turned into the indefeasible laws of life, have in all centuries 
supported people in sorrow and in joy, returned hope to them and helped them 
find their faith. The monumental values of Christianity formulated two thousand 
years ago have retained their deep meaning right up to the present day. 
As we enter the third millennium, I firmly believe that the ideals of Christianity 
will make it possible to strengthen understanding and accord in our society, and 
serve the spiritual and moral revival of our fatherland (2000a). 
 
Christian values are seen as good for the Russian state, and key to strengthening 
Russia morally. This holiday greeting is very different from the one Putin issued for 
Ramadan in the same year: 
People of different faiths have lived side-by-side in Russia for centuries. The land 
we all share has always cherished peace and accord above anything else. Islam 
and Christianity both preach those supreme values. ‘Cooperate in good deeds’ and 
‘Do not assist evil,’ the Koran says. 
The outgoing century has taught us many lessons, the most important of which is 
that a strong and worthy 21st century state can be built only by joint efforts. We 
will never attain wellbeing and prosperity unless we respect and understand each 
other, however different we might appear. 
We highly value the traditions of civil and interdenominational accord, which the 
Russian Muslim community has always respected. We attach great importance to 
the efforts of the Muslim clergy and to its ample peacemaking experience. We 
count on its further contribution to the cause of interethnic peace and religious 
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tolerance in our country, and to the restoration of law, order and normal life in the 
North Caucasus (2000b) 
 
This statement alludes to the Second Chechen War, and shows that Putin views 
official Islamic communities as being on his side, rather than sympathetic to the 
separatists. He uses an excerpt from the Koran to code the Chechens as evil, thus splitting 
the Islamic community into two groups: those with the state, and the separatists. Yet, 
comparing these two holiday statements and the language used shows how Putin codes 
the state as Orthodox and even state-approved Islam as other.  Notable in the address is 
the absence of the special role of Islam in shaping Russia’s history or mentions of Islam 
in determining an essential Russian identity.  Peace is mentioned many times, but 
spiritual and moral revival is not. There is no reference to Islam in the Christmas address, 
yet a reference to Christianity in the Ramadan greeting and an emphasis on building a 
strong state through joint efforts.  Yet, Christian values are the key to building the strong 
Russian state in the Christmas address.  
Looking at state documents and state-issued holiday greetings shows that the Russian 
state, although claiming to be secular, treats Orthodoxy as having special historical and 
moral influence.  Importantly, in his speech on the 1020th year of Orthodoxy in Russia, 
Medvedev establishes a link between Russia’s political progress from ancient state to 
European state with Orthodoxy. The history of battles between Islamic tribes and 
Orthodox Russians are not mentioned directly; neither is the atheism of the Soviet period.  
In official public discourse, religious tensions from the past are silenced while Orthodoxy 
is celebrated as the bringer of culture and values. Meanwhile, in newspapers, a speech 
addressing the contributions of the Golden Horde to Russian culture brings up memories 
of war and violence. In order to examine state-Islamic relations, in Russia, first the 
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paradoxical secularism of the state must be highlighted:  Although the state claims that all 
religions are equal, one (Russian Orthodoxy) appears to be more equal than others.  
Section 4.2:  Islam and the Russian State 
In this section, I discuss discourses produced at the national scale relating to state-
Islamic relations in regards to moderate Islam. I show how prominent leaders and the 
president work to create a discourse of peace and Islam that they juxtapose with a 
rebellious Islam associated with the Chechen War.  Also, I examine how the state 
supports Islam within its borders in regards to funding Islamic education and creating a 
dialogue with Islamic communities. Doing so allows the state to play a role in fostering 
the growth of preferred, non-rebellious forms of Islam. 
Official Islam and Peace 
One of the strongest problems surrounding state-Islamic relations for the Kremlin is 
that Islamic rebels in Chechnya threaten the very fabric of the Russian Federation.  In 
reaction to this perceived threat, and in recognizing the varied nature of Russia’s Islamic 
communities, there is a strong emphasis at the national level of Islam’s alliance with the 
state and peaceful nature. The state repeatedly describes Islam as a peaceful religion, in 
order to contrast with images of terrorists. Putin opened a meeting with Muslim  
organization leaders with,  “I know that in your prayers, sermons and dialogues with 
people you always return to Islam's very fundamentals and Islam, like all peaceful 
religions, is based on kindness, on faith in kindness (January 10, 2006).” Using this 
particular language, the Russian government tries to show that it does not conflate Islam 
with terror. And in adopting this very language in turn, the official Islamic community 
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shows that they view the war in Chechnya as a battle of good and evil, with the state as 
good and rebels as evil. 
Separating Islam from the terrorist events is a key issue for the leaders of the official 
Islamic structures in Russia. After the Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis, where about 50 
Chechen guerillas took 850 prisoners hostage in 2002, the head of the Union of Muftis of 
Russia, Ravil Gainutdin, tried to distance Islam from the acts. He stated, “Mr President, 
we remember your statement that criminals have neither ethnicity nor religion. This is 
why we think that to contrast religions with each other is not the thing to do now. 
Religions are not guilty of this tragedy (Putin, Oct. 24, 2002).”  Mufti Akhmad-Khadzhi 
Shamayev, the pro-Moscow leader of Chechen Muslims, repeated this sentiment in the 
newspapers after the event, publicly stating “Terrorists have no nationality. If they are 
indeed Chechens and if they are Muslims, they must have at least something sacred in 
them... They are just giving their nation a bad name (“Rebels seize Moscow theatre” Oct. 
23, 2002).”  
Leaders of the moderate Islamic structures articulate their alliance and agreement 
with Putin, revealing that they pray for success in the war in the Caucasus.  In the 
meeting mentioned above, Ismael Berdiev, head of Coordinating Council of the Muslims 
of the Northern Caucasus, stated, “The situation in the Caucasus is now quieter, more 
stable. Thank you for having chosen the right policies. In mosques when people pray they 
already have started to ask, to pray for the President, to pray that everything works out for 
him. So that, by Allah, everything works out, everything is good (Putin, 2006).” Hearing 
these words come from an Islamic leader from the North Caucasus, after the height of 
Chechen insurgency, shows that leaders of official structures view the state as a means 
for the Islamic community there to achieve peace and stability.   
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Islam, Education, and the State 
Although the official Islamic leadership has requested Islamic banking systems and 
funding for mosque construction, education is the main area receiving government 
support (Medvedev, July 15, 2009). Proper education and leadership is seen as key to 
curbing extremism and is one area in which the Russian government has directly invested 
in Islam. In 2007, Putin approved the Fund for Supporting Islamic Culture, Science, and 
Education, which was worth about 60 million rubles (Putin, Nov. 8, 2007).  
 
Figure 4.2 Medvedev at the Cathedral Mosque in Moscow, with Islamic leader Ravil 
Gainutdin.(Russia Muftis Council, July 15, 2009.) 
In his visit to the Cathedral Mosque in Moscow in 2009 (Figure 4.2), the first visit of 
any Russian president to a mosque while in office, Medvedev also addressed the state’s 
interest in supporting Islamic education. He stated: 
Our world is still complicated, and there are various ethnic and religious conflicts. 
Unfortunately, we are also seeing an increase in extremism in many parts of the 
world, and sadly, extremist organisations are quite active in Russia. Clearly, 
extremists rely on many slogans: some religious ones, some related to Islam, 
some unrelated to Islam, and some that have nothing to do with religion. 
Nevertheless, this is a complicating factor that destabilises the situation in our 
country. We need to be aware of this and take all possible measures to mitigate it. 
In this context, our most important common challenge is to spread ideas of 
tolerance, religious and otherwise, and promote caring attitudes toward the 
religious values and traditions of different peoples in our multi-ethnic, culturally 
diverse nation. Here, the Muslim clergy plays an important role (2009). 
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In the Soviet era, only two institutes of higher learning for Islam were in operation. 
Since the collapse of the USSR, demand for religious training has risen, with over 22,000 
Muslims traveling abroad for education. Since 2007, eight government-sponsored higher-
education theological institutions in Russia have begun training for Islamic students.  
Goble reports that, “Because they (the students) were often supported by and thus 
attracted to more radical institutions in the Middle East and South Asia, these students 
often returned home with radical ideas (2009).” Aleksy, an official from the Presidential 
Administration, states that the government has adopted state standards for higher 
professional education in Islamic theology, and that over 320 students are enrolled in the 
classes (Hunter, 2004: 74; Goble, 2009). According to Islam News, an independent 
information source of Islam in Russia, “In previous years, most students went to Arab 
countries, where trained in lesser-known schools or preparatory courses. Lack of 
educational foundations contributed to the rapid spread of radical ideas among young 
people (“Russia Becomes the Center of Islamic Education,” 2009).” Adopting state 
standards and using state money to develop educational structures suggests that the 
Russian government is trying to moderate the spiritual and political ideas of the Islamic 
community. Simultaneously, distrust of Islamic education abroad is spread. 
The leaders of Russia’s official Islamic groups consider the funding of Islamic 
education within Russia as a form of state-building.  Domestic religious educational 
institutions try to separate themselves from extremism and stress how their curriculum 
creates feelings of patriotism in their students.  Education at religious institutions often 
combines religious training with other secular subjects, such as Russian language courses 
(Hunter, 2004: 71). In 2007, in response to government funding Gainutdin, stated: 
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And this (funding) will certainly help us train members of the clergy and help 
instill feelings of patriotism in them. It can also help the process of educating 
worthy members of the Islamic clergy in the Motherland, who can then resist the 
spread of alien ideologies and fight against extremism and radicalism (Putin, 
2007). 
 
The above quote shows that Islamic community leaders are interested in keeping 
radical ideas away from their communities in favor of building a cadre of future leaders 
that are Russian Islamic citizens. Russian policies seek to develop Islam within Russia so 
that influences from radical Islam abroad can be obviated, as evidenced in the discourse 
surrounding the Russian state’s support of Islamic education (Hunter, 2004: 74). 
       Textual analysis of state documents and transcripts of meetings at the national level 
suggests that the government and the leaders of official Islamic structures have similar 
opinions on many issues, such as a disapproval of the Chechen War and the role state-
funded education can have in nurturing Islamic citizens. Above all, discourses 
surrounding official Islam at the national level paint Islam as a peaceful faith, and one 
that has aims of protecting the nation from radicalism that are harmonious with the 
government. Official Islam is imagined as a strength of the state and even a subtle 
mechanism of state power in its production of good citizens, rather than a threat. 
In the following section, I turn to the multicultural Russian city of Astrakhan. Doing 
so will investigate if and how the dominant discourses surrounding state-Islamic 
relationships produced at the national level play out in the everyday lives in Astrakhan.  I 
will focus on the politics of mosque-building locally, and see what this analysis might 
reveal about macro-scale state-Islamic relations. 
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Section 4.3:  Contemporary Discourses on Islam in Astrakhan, Russia   
Astrakhan is characterized by its ethnic and religious diversity, as evidenced in the 
travel writings of Ibn Battuta, a Berber explorer, and also in its restored religious 
landscape. At the 1999 International forum “For a Culture of Peace and Dialogue Among 
Civilizations in the Third Millenium, held in Moscow and sponsored by UNESCO, the 
mayor of Astrakhan Igor Bezrukavnikov gave a talk called “Peace to the Coming One”  
on the role of mayors and the mass media on violence prevention. He stated: 
Astrakhan has become the Southern outpost of Russia, when its frontiers lie close 
to the troubled area of Chechnya, multi-lingual Dagestan, mysterious Kalmykia, 
this issue (violence prevention) is of special importance. Throughout its history 
Astrakhan has never experienced national wars or religious rebellions - here 
people have always traded, fished, built cathedrals and brought up children 
together. What we need is not to lose, to break the "uniting threads of centuries" 
(Bezrukavnikov 1999). 
Astrakhan is imagined as a place with a heritage of peaceful coexistence of very 
different peoples. Notably, the destruction of the city by Tamerlane and again by Ivan the 
Terrible is not mentioned.  Bezrukavnikov believes that this imagined history of harmony 
must be preserved by civil, spiritual, and state intuitions to pass on to future generations 
of citizens (1999).   
Peace, Tolerance, Respect: Mosque-State Relations in Astrakhan 
The historic role of Astrakhan’s Islamic community in preserving peace is evidenced 
in an address to Astrakhan’s Islamic community on the holiday Kurban Bairam by the 
chairman of the State Duma, Alexander Klykanov. He states: 
The great authority, Astrakhan Spiritual Administration of Muslims (ARDUM), 
and all Muslims of the Astrakhan region will continue to promote the preservation 
of international peace in the region. Only by following the traditions of the 
strengthening of civil harmony, interfaith dialogue, understanding and good 
relations between people we can count on the future  and further welfare and 
prosperity of the Astrakhan region (Office of Press Service, Nov. 27 2009). 
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The regional authority of Islam, ARDUM, is depicted as an asset to bringing and 
assuring peace in the city region. This sentiment is expressed repeatedly in the annual 
holiday addresses. 
During a meeting with the Astrakhan governor, Talgat Tajuddin, the chairman of the 
Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia (TsDUM), stated that Astrakhan 
was a good example of religious tolerance within Russia. He stated, “You managed to 
find the golden rod of the fraternal relations (“Supreme Mufti of Russia Talgat Tajuddin 
visited the Astrakhan Region,” 2006).” At the national level, official Islam is depicted as 
a peaceful religion which gives its members values beneficial for Russian society.  This 
characterization of Islam is reproduced at the local-level governmental discourse in 
Astrakhan, and plays a role in giving Astrakhan a reputation as a peaceful, tolerant, 
multi-confessional city.   
Claims of a tolerant past and present by the media or official figures, however, do not 
map exactly onto minority groups experiences (Mills, 2006).  Thus, beyond looking at 
official reports, I visited mosques to interview local members of the Astrakhan 
community. I wanted to see how they viewed tolerance and state-mosque relationships. I 
interviewed many prominent members of mosque communities, including six males and 
one female.   
From interviews, I found that many members of local Islamic communities also 
desired strong state-mosque relations, and feel the local government promotes religious 
tolerance.  When I visited the central mosque in Astrakhan, the location of the offices 
ARDUM, my interviewee pointed out a photograph on the wall: an image of Putin 
shaking hands with Nazymbek Ilyasov, the mufti of ARDUM.  This photograph was also 
hanging in the Islamic goods shop in the mosque’s courtyard. This photograph displays 
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good relations between the nation-state and the local Islamic communities affiliated with 
ARDUM.  It suggests that the nation-state approves of ARDUM and the Islamic 
communities in Astrakhan, and its prominent positioning suggests that the official Islamic 
community is proud of their relationship with the state. 
When I interviewed a leader of the Islamic community at the central mosque, he told 
me that Putin and Medvedev both worked to further the development of traditional Islam 
in Russia’s borders. He voiced that he did not see a difference in Putin and Medvedev’s 
policies towards Islam, stating that they both try to promote the good reputation of 
traditional Islam.  I also asked interviewees how they viewed the relationship between the 
local government and local Islamic communities.  The three respondents from the Central 
mosque reported that the local government supports Islamic communities through 
establishing laws on religious tolerance. One respondent said, “We tolerate and respect 
all confessions recognized by the government (Interview transcript, July 2009).” In the 
space of the mosque, the state at the national and local levels is seen as the promoter of 
religious tolerance, which allows for communities to grow. However, tolerance applied 
only to communities of faith recognized by the government.  
Section 4.4:  Islam and Others: Tatars and Caucasian Islamic Communities in 
Astrakhan 
In my interviews, the phrase traditional Islam was repeated several times. For 
instance, when I asked one interviewee, a scholar who had been educated in Cairo during 
the Soviet period, if he felt free to practice his faith, he responded, “we are free to 
practice traditional Islam (Interview transcript, July 2009).” When I asked what he meant 
by traditional Islam, my interviewee contrasted it against “Chechen” Islam. Traditional 
Islam is associated with Volga Bulgaria, and the history of the Tatars (Interview 
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transcript, July 2009). At the local level, the nationwide split between official and 
unofficial Islam appears to be coded as a split between traditional Tatar Islam, and 
Chechen Islam. In this section, I first examine the role of “tradition” in Islamic 
community-building in Astrakhan. Then, I discuss discourses of integration and 
interruption surrounding Caucasian immigrant Islamic communities in Astrakhan.  Doing 
so will display the multi-faceted landscape of Islam in Astrakhan, and reveal how official 
and non-official Islamic communities interact at the everyday level. 
Preservation and restoration of traditional spaces of worship are two important 
discourses in Islamic-community building in post-Soviet Astrakhan.  On a tour of the 
central mosque, the Islamic scholar I was interviewing was very proud of renovations. He 
pointed to the decorated posts, stating, “Ancient, old architecture is very important 
(Interview, July 2009).” These posts (Figure 4.3) are modeled after their originals, built 
in 1898 and ruined due to lack of funds for upkeep in the Soviet period. 
One of the ways that the local government has supported Islamic community 
development politically is through returning mosques confiscated and repurposed in 
Soviet times to communities of faith.  
The restoration of the White Mosque, the main mosque of Tatars before the Soviet 
era (Syzranov, 2007: 55), is an example of how the state supports the development of 
traditional Islam. Renovations began in 2001, but the Islamic community had difficulty 
raising the 15 million rubles necessary for the project. The mosque was partly funded 
through donations from Kazan, local businesses, as well as a half a million  
ruble contribution from the Astrakhan government (Interviews, July 2009). Members of 
 
68 
 
Figure 4.3 Historical design in the central mosque. 
the local government were involved in fundraising efforts- for example, the mayor of 
Astrakhan Sergei Bozhenov performed at a charity concert for the mosque (Gadelshina, 
2008). In 2008, the White mosque officials re-opened as part of Astrakhan’s 450th 
anniversary celebrations (Figure 4.4).  Striving to complete the White Mosque in time for 
the celebration shows that the local government takes an interest in preserving Tatar 
Islamic history. Restorations to the Kremlin and Volga promenade were also completed 
for the occasion.  
The White Mosque is in a historical Tatar neighborhood, located near the Astrakhan 
Kremlin (Figure 4.6). During the 450th anniversary, the street that the White Mosque and 
other mosques are located was renamed to Kazanskaya. In 1920, the street name was 
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changed to Spartakovskaya Street, in honor of Spartacus, a slave who led a revolt against 
aristocracy in Rome. The name change was proposed by the Tatar national center in 
Astrakhan, and agreed on by the region’s governor, Alexander Zhilkin. Kazanskaya is the 
adjective form of Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan and a large city in the Golden Horde 
(Gadelshina, 2008). Kazan is the only city in Russia with a mosque in its kremlin, and the 
center of Tatar Islamic culture. This street name change shows how the local government 
politically supports Tatar culture. 
The street name change is both in honor of Tatar culture in Astrakhan, and in 
recognition of the historical importance of Kazan. In 2006, Kazan celebrated its 1000th 
anniversary. By changing a street name to honor the city, the local government 
acknowledges historical ties to the Tatar homeland. At the national level, the role of the 
Golden Horde and history of the Tatars to the development of the nation state is heavily 
criticized, while at the local-level such historical connections are valorized.  
 
Figure 4.4: White Mosque after renovations. 
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Although at the national level, Islamic and intellectual communities debate about the 
role of the Golden Horde in establishing the Russian state, Tatar history is important to 
local Islamic communities in Astrakhan.  At an interview in the central mosque, 
when I asked how Islam helps the government, a respondent answered, “Traditionally, 
Islam is important in the historic founding of our people (Interview, July 2009).”  This 
answer shows that locals view their religion as playing a positive role in the formation of 
the political state. Religion and Islam in particular is seen as a positive and historical 
factor working with the state to create Astrakhan’s identity, rather than as working in a 
separate sphere from the government. 
  
Figure 4.5: Kazanskaya Street, Astrakhan.  
One way Astrakhan Islamic communities maintain their ties to Tatar Islamic history 
is through annual pilgrimages to Bolghar. Bolghar is located near Kazan, and is 
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considered to be its predecessor. Importantly, it is the site of the conversion of the ancient 
Tatar people to Islam in 922. One respondent stated “Bolghar is where the Grand 
Mothers and Fathers taught Islam a thousand years ago (Interview, July 2009).” Every 
year, the central mosque organizes two buses to take about 100 people on a pilgrimage to 
this holy site (Interview, July 2009).  Maintaining historical connections to Kazan and to 
the historic homeland of Tatar Islam is an important element of tradition in Islamic 
community-building in Astrakhan. 
While state and local officials generally view connections with Kazan in a positive 
light, relationships with Caucasian elements of the Islamic community are more 
complicated.  At the central mosque, disapproval of non-traditional forms of Islam is 
articulated which mirrors the disapproval of Chechen rebels produced by official Islamic 
groups at the national level. Due to its proximity to the Caucuses, Astrakhan is home to 
many migrant communities from the war-torn region. There are many immigrant 
communities within Astrakhan, including sizeable Chechen and Dagestani communities 
(Matsuzato, 2007).  These groups, often affiliated with non-official Islamic communities, 
use a variety of strategies to adapt into Astrakhan’s wider Islamic community. 
After perestroika, many North Caucasian peoples started selling products in the 
traditionally Tatar Bazaar. In the 1990, the regional and city government turned over a 
mosque located in the bazaar to the local community. This mosque became known as the 
Caucasian Mosque (Figure 4.6) because it has members from Caucasian immigrants, like 
Avar, Dargin, and Laks, besides Kazakhs and Tatars (Matsuzato, 2007).  The mosque is 
popular, with 300-400 Muslims attending daily prayers and 1,300-1,500 attending Friday 
prayers (Matsuzato, 2007).  Traditionally, Tatars and Kazakhs only attend mosque 
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prayers on Fridays, and there has been some fights and conflict in the market over the 
large crowds showing up to pray and interrupting business (Matsuzato, 2007).  
 The difference in prayer cultures highlights differences amongst Islamic 
communities in Astrakhan. Although the prayer practices of those at the Caucasian 
mosque disturb business, the skirmishes over praying reflect tensions existing between  
wanted and unwanted forms of Islam in Astrakhan and also in Russia. Going to 
mosque on Friday is a hallmark of moderate, traditional Islam, while going to mosque 
daily is associated with Caucasian influences and the threat of introducing Wahhabism in 
the city. Wahhabism is associated with the teachings of Muhammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab, 
and is the main form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. In Russia, Wahhabism is practiced 
principally in Dagestan and Chechnya (Hunter, 2004: 87). Yet, Wahhabism has a double 
meaning within Russia. Authorities have used Wahhabism to refer both to strict adherents 
of Islamic faith or to Islamic people who engage in violence, especially in the Caucasus 
(Hunter, 2004: 81).  The new Caucasian presence in the city and the popularity of the 
Caucasian mosque indicate the arrival of a new form of Islam in Astrakhan. 
 
Figure 4.6: Caucasian Mosque. (“Churches and Mosques in Astrakhan: Caucasian 
Mosque,” 2008.) 
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Many young activists worship at this mosque and support it because they do not like 
being part of ARDUM (Matsuzato, 2007). This mosque is not officially a member of 
ARDUM, but has connections with ARDUM.. The mosque’s imam is Abukhasan 
Musaev, a famous Avar from Chechnya. His appointment was confirmed by the head 
mufti of ARDUM, and he is considered to be a moderating influence on the parish.  For 
instance, Musaev was educated within the former Soviet Union, he conducts services in 
Russian, and refers to both Dagestani and other  madhhabs, Islamic schools of law, in his 
teachings to appeal to the broader multiethnic Islamic community (Matsuzato, 2007: 
794).  And, the Dagestani mosque’s madrassah exchanges lecturers with the ARDUM’s 
Khajji-Tarkhan institute (Matsuzato, 2007: 795).  These steps show that the leadership of 
the Caucasian mosque makes efforts to separate their Islamic community in Astrakhan 
from the types of communities that exist in their homelands.  State-approved and official 
Islamic education plays an important role in making the Caucasian mosque seem more 
moderate as opposed to “radical”.  Their imam was selected because he was educated in 
one of the two centers of Islamic training open in the Soviet period, and ARDUM –
approved educators visit the Caucasian madrassah.  Through creating links with 
ARDUM, the Caucasian mosque tries to maintain the tradition of interfaith dialogue and 
peace on which Astrakhan prides itself. While it is not part of the official structure of 
Islam, the Caucasian mosque acts as part of the wider community, partly in order to in 
avoid suspicions of extremism. 
Most of the communities of faith in Astrakhan maintain positive ties with the local 
and nation-state government, as evidenced by the presence of Putin in the Central 
Mosque, and in assistance with the rebuilding of historical mosques. The Tatar Islamic 
community seems to have a favored relationship with the state, as seen in the renaming of 
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the street, assistance with the White Mosque, and the large number of Tatar officials in 
ARDUM (Matsuzato, 2007).  In this sense, state preference for Tatar forms of Islam by 
the Russian state echoes the state preference of Russian Orthodoxy. The Caucasian 
community, partly due to the leadership’s moderation, has its own building and 
educational school. Many of the discourses produced on the national level about how the 
state supports official Islam and sees Islam as a peaceful religion which instills good 
values to its members are reproduced in Astrakhan.  In fact, the city has been upheld as a 
prime example of healthy state-mosque relationships by the leader of TsDUM. 
Astrakhan’s growing Islamic landscape seems to be the result of positive state-Islamic 
relations.  In addition to this visible presence of Islam in Astrakhan, however, there are 
also important absences and silences that I discuss in the following section. 
Section 4.5:  Demolition of Mosque 34: Islamic Communities and State Conflict 
As I tried to track down mosques to visit for my research, I consulted guidebooks, 
web sites, and local people in Astrakhan.  There are over 30 mosques in the city, and so I 
was very busy visiting these places. One day, while I was just leaving the central mosque, 
a man came up to me, asked me about my research, and if I had seen the mosque by the 
airport yet. I did not know that there was a mosque by the airport, because no one had 
mentioned it to me and it simply did not show up on any type of map.  He told me that 
this mosque was well-known, and that I absolutely must visit it.   
A day later, I visited the mosque, Mosque 34 (Figure 4.5) and learned about its 
dilemma.  Although the mosque received building permits in 2003, they were revoked 
after a visit by president Putin in 2005 and a regime change in Astrakhan’s local 
government.  The community was ordered by the local government to demolish what 
they had already built. Yet, according to the mosque’s imam, 20-25 Muslims live in the 
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area, and there is an Islamic graveyard nearby. Despite this, the mosque was said to be 
improperly located on an access road in a neighborhood by the airport. The situation 
facing Mosque 34 reflects differing interests of the pragmatic state and the spiritual 
community in the construction of urban spaces (Kong 1993). It also reveals how the 
construction of everyday spaces of worship can contribute to an understanding of larger-
scale issues (Kong 2010). The Islamic community has sued the local, regional, and 
national government for the right to build. Although they have ceased construction, they 
have not demolished the structure completely. The community still worships in an old 
silage tower located on the property (Interviews, July 2009).  The discourses surrounding 
the demolition and lawsuits of Mosque 34 provide important insights into the ways that 
local Islamic communities and governments converse with each other in instances of 
conflict as I show below. 
Sacred Spaces and Secular Concerns 
The local government framed its argument for demolition in functionalist terms, 
reflecting what Kong refers to as a “material concern in its treatment of religious 
buildings (1993: 346).” The building was halted by an order from the regional branch of 
the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear Monitoring, which 
claimed that the mosque was located within a dangerous distance of 110-kV transmission 
lines. The minaret is said to be located seven meters from the outer cable, when safety 
standards call for a distance of twenty meters.  According to the manager of 
Astrakhanenergo, the Astrakhan power company: 
It is impossible to guarantee people’s safety when the power grid safety rules are 
being breached in this way. Astrakhanenergo has warned all parties involved of 
the adverse consequences which could ensue. We set our point of view in court 
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that the mosque in its current form is placing people’s lives in danger (“Muslims 
resist order to demolish new mosque in Southern Russia”, April 11, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Proposed Plans for Mosque 34 
The mayor and local government paint orders for demolition as a pragmatic decision, 
based on a violation of safety protocols and concern for citizens. 
In addition to safety concerns, the local government also cites that the mosque should 
be demolished because of zoning issues. Oleg Popov, the head of Astrakhan regional 
government’s department for work with religious organizations, stated the decision to 
demolish the mosque was reached because, ‘the local Muslim community violated the 
law when it occupied a land plot intended for an apartment building (“Astrakhan 
Muslims protest against knocking down of an unfinished mosque”, April 11, 2006).” The 
local authorities have requested that the Islamic community pay for the demolition, but 
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have also offered the community four alternative plots of land on which to build their 
new mosque (“Muslims resist order to demolish new mosque in Southern Russia,” April 
11, 2006).  The regional court cited failure to pay rent, inappropriate land use, deviations 
from the proposed architectural plan, and failure to obtain consent from the power 
company for building near an electric grid as reasons for demolition (Determination of 
the Judicial Collegium for Civil cases of the Astrakhan Regional Court, April 10, 2006).   
The state’s appeal to such values of pragmatism, planning, and safety makes the orders to 
demolish the mosque seem rational and based in secular concerns (Kong, 1993).  The 
Islamic community is made to look irrational because they ignore these pragmatic 
concerns and refuse to move to alternative, appropriate spaces. 
Questioning Secular Concerns of the State 
However, the mosque’s community questions the secular arguments made against 
them, claiming that their building permits are legal and that underlying Islamophobia 
informs the local government’s decision. Rather than viewing the state as taking a 
functionalist, pragmatic stance in their orders to demolish the mosque (Kong 1993), the 
Islamic community feels the state is violating their rights to religious freedom. The 
community states that the plot of land was purchased from the Astrakhan City Hall in 
1998, and that appropriate documents relating to ownership and design were filed with 
the Department of Real Estate and Architectural Administration of Astrakhan (“Protest 
action against tearing down mosque in Astrakhan,” April 12, 2006). The head of Mosque 
34’s parish council stated, “Today our building is the result of joint activities with our 
former authorities: the late governor and former mayor (“The district court ruled the 
demolition of a mosque,” February 10, 2006).” So, the mosque community does not 
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accept the rational basis of the secular claims made against them, and challenges them 
with received permits and official approval.  
According to the mosque community, the opposition to the mosque began after 
regime change in local offices and Putin’s visit to the city in 2005.  They claim that in 
August 2005, President Putin remarked to the regional governor and mayor that they had 
not chosen a good place for a mosque (Russia Country International Religious Freedom 
Report, 2006).  Mosque leader Asya Mahmudova stated, “The current mayor of the city 
of Astrakhan Sergei Bazhenov and Governor of Astrakhan Region Alexander Zhilikin do 
not like the fact that a mosque and not a church is located at the entrance to the town 
(“The district court ruled the demolition of a mosque,” February 10, 2006).” One 
interviewee, a charitable donor of mosque 34, said that authorities were upset with the 
location of the mosque because they did not want people arriving to Astrakhan via airport 
to think they were in Saudi Arabia (Interview, July 2009).  Importantly, the mosque is 
located near an Islamic graveyard and near about 20-25 Islamic families (Interview, July 
2009).  In an interview, the mosque imam stated that locals want to visit the graveyard 
and then come pray at the mosque. The imam felt that it is very comforting for the 
community to have a mosque near this graveyard. (Interview, July 2009).  Because of 
these factors, as well as the money and time spent investing in the site, the local 
community did not want to move their mosque (Russia Country International Religious 
Freedom Report, 2006).  The local community believed that national identity politics 
rather than welfare and safety concerns motivated the orders to demolish the mosque.  
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Islamophobic Discourses in Astrakhan and Moscow 
Because the local community believed that have official approval as well as sacred 
obligation to build near a graveyard and provide services for local families, they framed 
their protests against the local, regional, and state court decisions in terms of political 
persecution and Islamophobia. After unsuccessfully appealing to district and regional-
level courts to stop the removal of their mosque, ten people from Astrakhan and the 
Moscow activist group “For Human Rights” picketed the decision in Moscow.  The 
protestors carried signs saying, “Russia is a multi-national state. Muslims are full-fledged 
citizens,” “Shame on Islamaphobes in Astrakhan”, “We respect authority and demand 
that they respect us!” and “Places of worship are protected! (“Protest action against 
tearing down mosque in Astrakhan,” April 12, 2006).” These signs portray that the 
demolition as Islamophobia and a violation of Islamic citizens’ rights, thereby 
challenging the image of Astrakhan as an exemplar of multiconfessional tolerance within 
Russia. 
In response to accusations of Islamophobia, the Astrakhan government reaffirmed 
their stance on protecting citizens and commitment to religious tolerance in Astrakhan. 
Alexander Belov, the head of department on work with public and religious accusations 
in Astrakhan, stated, “The rumors of the mayor’s anti-Muslim positions are unfounded. 
In the city, due to participation of the administration, there are 17 Muslim and 18 
Orthodox churches that have never faced harassment (Tyukaeva, April 10, 2006).” City 
administrator Andrei Semonov stated, “We want to prevent any interpretation regarding 
the incitement of ethnic hatred and religious background (Tyukaeva, April 10, 2006).”  
To combat accusations of Islamophobia in regards to mosque construction near the 
airport, the city brings up its support of Islamic mosque-building in other areas of the 
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city. However, Mahmudova believes that the Islamic community in Astrakhan supports 
Mosque 34, claiming that eleven parish leaders have appealed to the governor asking to 
halt demolition, and that thousands of people have signed petitions against the decision 
(“The district court ruled the demolition of a mosque,” February 10, 2006). 
In order to correct what they felt was violations of their rights at the local level, 
Mosque 34’s Islamic community placed hopes for correction at the federal level. Asya 
Mahmudova, the mosque’s imam, stated, “The courts are blindly supporting the 
administration. We can’t even get local newspapers to print our views so we have been 
obligated to come here to Moscow. We believe we will be listened to and the federal 
government will help us, that is our hope (“Russian Muslims and rights activists rallied in 
Moscow on Monday,” April 12, 2006).” The community sent appeals to Putin, but 
claimed that their letters never reached his office (“The district court ruled the demolition 
of a mosque,” February 10, 2006).  By placing hope in the federal government, 
Mahmudova shows that she believes that the national-level courts and president will view 
that the decisions made by the state at the local level are not informed by pragmatic 
concerns, but are unlawful violations of the rights of Islamic citizens.   
The federal court sided with the Astrakhan courts’ decisions in the Supreme Court 
case on June 10, 2006.  In response to this decision, members of Russia’s Islamic 
community from Astrakhan and other regions banded together to protest again. A letter 
from Islamic leaders to Putin state that they view the demolition as akin to political 
persecution. They wrote: 
Speaking at the opening ceremony of the Parliament of Chechen Republic, you 
claimed that Russia had always been and still remained a most reliable defender 
of Islam. We believe in the sincerity of these words and value the fact they came 
from the mouth of the head of a great country and the warrantor of Russian 
constitution. 
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Yet, regrettably, it frequently occurs in our country that middle and lower levels 
of state power distort the policies of their superiors and turn them into something 
opposite to what they were intended to be. 
The new city authorities in Astrakhan are planning to demolish the mosque, 
which construction was approved by the previous mayor, thus trying to discredit 
both the head of our state and the state in general without having any solid ground 
for such decision. 
 
The court of law, including the Supreme Court of Russian Federation, has ruled in 
favour of Astrakhanian authorities. All complaints and appeals in defense of the 
mosque, including those sent to the General Prosecutor's office and the Human 
Rights Commissioner (ombudsman) of the Russian Federation, didn't lead to any 
positive results. We consider this to be a case of political persecution (March 7, 
2007). 
 
The letter was signed by more than 3,000 Russian Muslims, including Nafigulla 
Ashirov,Co-chairman of Russia's Mufti Council, Muqaddas Bibarsov, Co-chairman of 
Russia's Mufti Council, Shamil Sultanov,State Duma member, Marat Saifutdinov, Chief-
editor of Islam.ru, and Denga Khalidov, Advisor to the President and corresponding 
member of the Academy for Geopolitical Issues and chairman of Center for the Issues of 
Ethnopolitics and Islam. It appeared in Izvestiya Gazeta, a national newspaper. This letter 
shows that many prominent Russian Muslims feel that lower levels of state power do not 
support Islamic community-building. This letter is an appeal to the president, as 
guarantor of the Russian Constitution, to protect Islamic citizens’ from abuses from 
regional and city governments.  
However, the president did not reply directly to the letter. Rather, Ostrovsky, a 
member of the Presidential Administration released a statement online. In the statement 
Ostrovsky told the signees that the Russian courts are subject to the Constitution, and that 
if they had problems with the judicial branch that they needed to communicate with the 
judicial branch. In regards to Mosque 34, he wrote: 
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The said building is not built. Construction of the mosque had been suspended at 
the very outset, as was held in violation of applicable laws. The decision of the 
local authorities to postpone the construction of a mosque and move to another 
location were approved with the Supreme Mufti of TSDUM T. Tajuddin.  
 
Please inform on the outcome of your treatment of all signatories to its citizens 
(2007). 
By telling the signees that they needed to pursue formal channels to challenge the 
demolition, the official dismissed the President’s role in the case. He also reiterated that 
the findings of the court were approved by the leader of one of Russia’s official Islamic 
structures.  This is also evidenced by the lack of response directly from Putin himself. 
Although Islamic communities relied on the state and official structures within Russia as 
a means of obtaining justice, the state issued support of the findings of the court and in 
the integrity of state power at all levels.  The Islamic community used discourses of 
Islamic rights, and the state at all levels responded with pragmatic discourses of their 
responsibilities for citizen’s safety.  
Yet, Mosque 34’s Islamic community has not stopped appealing the decision. They 
have turned to international court systems, and their case is scheduled to appear in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg (Interview, July 2009). The 
controversy over this mosque has been mentioned in reports on religious freedom and 
property rights by Forum 18, a religious news service based in Oslo (Fagan, 2006), as 
well as in the 2006 Russian Country International Religious Freedom Report (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor). The demolition is cited in international reports 
as an example of the violation of religious freedom in Russia. Astrakhan, a city 
associated with a long history of religious tolerance, has started to develop a reputation as 
a case study of religious intolerance at an international level.  
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Section 4.6:  Summary 
Many of the Islamic communities within Astrakhan perceive that they are supported 
by the local government, and emphasize the roles of tolerance, respect, and preservation 
of tradition which help Islamic community-building.  Even though members of 
Astrakhan’s communities are immigrants from the Caucasus, they still have their own 
mosque, and are integrated to Astrakhan’s Islamic community.  Local communities and 
governments dialectically produce a discourse of peaceful Islamic-state relations which is 
similar to ones produced at the national level. But, Mosque 34’s community believes that 
political motivations and exclusion underpin the built environment of Islam in Astrakhan. 
Despite its reputation as a tolerant multiconfessional city, they believe that the secular 
government at the local, regional, and national levels does not feel that the airport 
highway is a place where Astrakhan’s Islamic identity can be on display. Rather, Islamic 
mosque construction is focused on revitalizing historic mosques in their appropriate 
historical neighborhood contexts.   
Mosque 34’s lawsuit is used by international institutions monitoring religious 
freedom to categorize Russia as a place of tense state-mosque relations, undermining 
Astrakhan’s reputation as a peaceful, multi-cultural city.  The demolition issue disrupts 
the narrative official Islamic groups and state leaders create on state support of Islam. 
Also, the demolition order also challenges the notion that the state supports or 
disapproves of Islamic groups based on their degree of radicalism or ethnic make-up. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
In order to explore the complexities of what cultural landscapes of religion reveal 
about geopolitical relationships of Islam and the state in Russia, I performed a discourse 
analysis on the self-presentation of tolerance at both the national and local scales. Besides 
looking at the words spoken by governmental officials in Astrakhan, the Russian 
government, and leaders of ARDUM, I also traveled to the city and interviewed local 
leaders. My approach was informed by the fields of critical geopolitics and critical 
geographies of religion. These fields influenced my decision to do a local study 
(O’Tuathail, forthcoming; Kong 1993; Ehrkamp, 2007).  From feminist critical 
geopolitics, I borrowed the element of focusing on what everyday religious landscapes 
could reveal about state-Islamic relationships (Pain, 2009).  
In this project, I first explored how secularism is enacted in Russia.  At the national 
level, the Russian government has pledged a separation of state and religion in the 
constitution, with all religious groups being seen as equal before the law.  However, an 
analysis of official language used in governmental addresses to Orthodox and Islamic 
communities showed that the state feels Orthodoxy has played a special role in 
influencing Russia’s history and culture that other groups have not. At the national level 
and within Astrakhan, this differential treatment of a religious group is reproduced in the 
preference of Tatar or “traditional” Islam over forms from Islamic separatists. The state’s 
involvement in fostering moderate Islam at the national level is seen through the funding 
of Islamic education.  In Astrakhan, this preference for Islam associated with Tatar 
culture is echoed through renaming a street after Kazan, the historic center of Tatar Islam. 
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Also, I examined how the state views itself as supportive of Islam at the national 
level, and how this discourse of tolerance is reproduced at the local scale by both Islamic 
communities and Astrakhan’s regional and city government. Photographs of Putin and 
Astrakhan’s mufti shaking hands are displayed in the Central Mosque, symbolizing the 
state’s interest in promoting Islamic growth. The state paints itself as a friend of Islam 
through its preferential treatment of moderate Islam, and the official Islamic 
organizations align themselves with the state in the move to eliminate the rebellious 
forms of Islam in the Caucasus.  
I used the production of the Astrakhan mosque landscape as an analytical lens to 
understand state-Islam relations at multiple scales. Although the state does not provide 
financial support for mosque construction at the national scale, local governments support 
Islam politically through returning mosques confiscated in the Soviet period to their 
religious communities. And, in the case of Astrakhan’s White Mosque, some government 
funding was used to aid construction. Visiting the historical core of Astrakhan shows that 
the local Islamic communities have experienced growth and have been able to preserve 
many historic mosques- the White Mosque looks new, and the historical Black Mosque is 
under renovation. 
Next, I discussed how a proposed mosque demolition in Astrakhan disturbs 
discourses of tolerance and respect of the state towards Islam produced at the local and 
national level.  Although the local government used a pragmatic concern over safety to 
justify the demolition of mosque 34, the mosque community challenged these concerns, 
protesting that the local government is Islamophobic. My local-level research revealed 
many contradictions which exist within the Russian state. Rather than a seamless 
structure, from the local perspective the state appears as a messy assemblage of 
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contradicting individuals, institutions and discourses. Although Mosque 34 felt they had 
received the appropriate permits from the local government, after regime change in the 
mayoral office the local government argued that they had not.  The presence of national 
leaders has affected Islamic landscapes in Astrakhan in two opposing ways.  Photographs 
of Putin and Astrakhan’s mufti shaking hands are displayed in the Central Mosque, 
symbolizing the state’s interest in promoting Islamic growth. Yet, interviewees and the 
Russian Country International Religious Freedom Report (2006) claim that the 
demolition was ordered after Putin remarked to the Astrakhan regional governor and city 
mayor that they had not chosen a good location for a mosque.  The Astrakhan Kremlin 
and Dormition Cathedral are the markers of the gateway to the city from the Volga, and 
opponents to the demolition believe that Putin and local leaders did not want a mosque to 
be the first image visitors see when coming from the airport, a modern gateway to the 
city (Interview, July 2009).  The partially-built mosque now sits off of the airport 
highway, half-way between construction and demolition and a visible symbol of tensions 
existing between the state at the local, regional, and national level and the local 
community of Mosque 34. 
My research explored how local religious communities can become international 
actors.  Mosque 34’s community has challenged court orders for demolition at the 
international scale through bringing their case to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Minorities use such transnational institutions to make political claims and put pressure on 
the nation-state (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003).  The court case has attracted some 
attention from NGOs, who use it to question religious freedom in Russia.  Besides 
challenging Russia’s commitment to religious freedom, the court case also undermines 
the strength of “power vertical” within Russia.  Although the nation-state provided a 
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court system for Mosque 34’s community to navigate, by turning to transnational legal 
spaces the community questions the authority and fairness of the Russian court system. 
Finally, my study shows that there is a need for further in-depth, local studies of 
religious communities, and of Islam especially, in contemporary Russia. Out of the seven 
interviews I conducted, I only had one with a woman leader. More work needs to be 
conducted exploring how gender impacts perceptions of state-Islamic relations, and also 
more work needs to be done to see how those other than scholars or leaders in Islamic 
communities view these relations.  
 In a similar vein, the issue of generational differences came up in my research. 
Matsuzato notes that the Caucasian mosque is popular with youth activists (2007: 794). 
More work needs to be done exploring issues of youth culture and religion in Astrakhan 
or other regions, as well as how generational differences impact perceptions of mosque-
state relations.  
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
The following themes will be addressed in interviews. Due to the open-ended nature of 
in-depth interviews, I am not able to provide a detailed list of exactly worded questions. 
Questions will be asked in English or Russian during interviews, and I will take written 
notes of answers with the consent of interviewees. 
 
Core questions (English): 
 
1) When was your mosque built?  
2) How many people attend religious services? 
3) Have you ever traveled to an Islamic country? If so, what was the nature of your 
travel? Have you ever made the hajj? 
4) Who finances your mosque or spiritual center? 
5) Does your mosque or religious center interact with a wider Islamic community? 
6) What are the differences between Islam in Astrakhan and Islam in other parts of 
Russia?   
7) What do you think is the relationship between government and religion in 
Astrakhan? And in Russia? 
8) Do you think that the Russian government supports Islam? Why or why not? 
9) What do you think are important subjects related to Islam in Astrakhan? What do 
 you think are important issues related to Islam in Russia? 
10) What is your opinion of religious freedom in Astrakhan? 
11)  In your opinion, do Russian politics influence Islam in Astrakhan? If yes, how? 
12) Is there anything else you would like to tell me about your life in Astrakhan? 
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Core Questions (Russian): 
 
1) Когда Bаша мечеть была построена? 
2) Сколько людей посещают религиозные службы?  
3) Вы когда-нибудь ездили в исламскую страну? Если да, то каков характер вашей 
поездки? Вы когда-нибудь сделали хадж?  
4) Кто финансирует Вашу мечеть и духовный центр?  
5) Существует ли в Вашей мечети или религиозным центре взаимодействия с более 
широкой исламской общиной?  
6) В чем заключаются различия между исламом в Астрахане и исламом в других 
регионах России?  
7) Как Вы думаете, какие отношения существуют между государством и религией в 
Астрахане? А в России?  
8) Как Вы думаете, российское правительство поддерживает ислам? Почему да или 
почему нет?  
9) Что Вы считаете важным вопросам, связанным с исламом в Астрахане? Что Вы 
считаете важным вопросам, связанным с исламом в России?  
10) Каково Bаше мнение о религиозной свободе в Астрахане?  
11) По Вашему мнению, влияют русские политики на ислам в Астрахане? Каким 
образом?  
12) Есть ли что-либо еще Вы хотели бы рассказать мне о своей жизни в Астрахане? 
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